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Acronyms and Abbreviations  
 
AAC Arctic Athabaskan Council (Arctic Council Permanent Participant) 
ACAP Arctic Contaminants Action Program (Arctic Council Working Group) 
AEST Alaska Economic Stabilization Team 
AHHEG Arctic Human Health Expert Group (SDWG Expert Group) 
AIA Aleut International Association (Arctic Council Permanent Participant) 
AIDS Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
AIP Arctic Investigations Program within the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention  
AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (Arctic Council Working Group) 
ANTHC Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium 
AOS Arctic Observing Summit (biennial science conference) 
ARENA Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy (SDWG project) 
ASNA Arctic Slope Native Association 
ASSW Arctic Science Summit Week (annual science conference) 
BIN Business Index North 
CAFF Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (Arctic Council Working Group) 
CARES Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (US) 
CDC United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
CERB Canadian Emergency Response Benefit 
CLINF Nordforsk Centre of Excellence 
Covid-19 Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) is an infectious disease caused by a newly 
discovered coronavirus. (WHO definition) 
 
EGBCM Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane (Arctic Council) 
EPPR Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (Arctic Council Working 
Group) 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
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FiFo Fly-in/Fly-out 
GCI Gwich’in Council International (Arctic Council Permanent Participant) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNWT Government of the Northwest Territories  
H1N1 Influenza A (H1N1), also known as swine flu 
HHAG Human Health Assessment Group (AMAP Expert Group) 
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
HIV Human immunodeficiency viruses 
HSS Health and Social Services (Canada) 
IASC International Arctic Science Committee 
IASSA International Arctic Social Sciences Association 
ICC Inuit Circumpolar Council (Arctic Council Permanent Participant) 
ICS International Circumpolar Surveillance  
ICSF Indigenous Community Support Fund (Canada) 
ICU  Intensive Care Unit 
INTERACT International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic 
ITK Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (Canadian organization representing over 60,000 Inuit)  
LEO Local Environmental Observer Network 
MHTTC Mental Health Technology Transfer Center (US) 
MOSAiC Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate 
NIHB National Indian Health Board (US) 
NSF National Science Foundation (US) 
NWT Northwest Territories 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
RAIPON Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (Arctic Council 
Permanent Participant) 
 
RDA Research Data Alliance 
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SAO Senior Arctic Official 
SAON Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks 
SARS-CoV-19 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the strain of 
coronavirus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). 
 
SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group (Arctic Council Working Group) 
SECEG Social, Economic, Cultural Expert Group (SDWG Expert Group) 
TKLK Traditional knowledge and local knowledge 
THL Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare  
UArctic University of the Arctic 
WHO World Health Organization 
YKHC Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation 
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Briefing document for Senior Arctic Officials: 
Overview of the coronavirus pandemic in the 
circumpolar Arctic  
 
Introduction 
In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak of the novel 
coronavirus disease a pandemic, bringing drastic changes to people’s lives overnight. Since 
then, Covid-19 has reminded the world of how vulnerable societies can be in the face of 
infectious diseases. The pandemic not only represents great risk to human health, it creates 
challenges for social, economic and cultural systems, despite the rapidly advancing global 
effort to develop countermeasures.  
As the coronavirus continues to spread across the globe, it has become evident that the 
pandemic and measures taken to prevent its spread would be poised to have significant 
effects on public health and societies. The Arctic region, especially rural and remote 
communities, faces unique risks and challenges as a result of both the pandemic and the 
actions taken to respond to it. Covid-19 underscores existing vulnerabilities of Arctic 
communities and may produce new challenges. Arctic communities have unique health and 
social needs and face distinctive circumstances. They also have longstanding physical and social 
infrastructure deficits and fragile and/or resource-dependent economies. On the other hand, 
the current circumstances also demonstrate the strengths and resilience of Arctic peoples. The 
global health crisis represents an opportunity to better understand and support the resilience 
of Arctic communities. 
Purpose  
The Arctic Council is well-positioned to play a leadership role in better understanding the 
impact of Covid-19 in the Arctic and spearheading activities to respond to the pandemic in the 
short-, medium- and longer-term. 
This briefing document was prepared to inform initial discussions regarding the coronavirus 
pandemic in the Arctic at the Senior Arctic Officials’ executive meeting (SAOX) on 24-25 June 
2020. It draws together available information – to date (June 2020) – about the impact of 
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Covid-19 and the actions taken to respond in the Arctic region. The document draws from a 
wide spectrum of sources, reflecting the complex and intricate nature of how Covid-19 affects 
Arctic peoples and communities, including national and subnational statistical databases and 
tools, peer-reviewed articles, policy statements, technical guidelines, field surveys, and local 
observations from Arctic communities. This document was produced using available material 
and data provided by reliable sources (see key resources that informed each section in 
appendix 1); however, given the short timeframe available to produce the document and the 
rapidly evolving situation, gaps in information remain and should be further examined moving 
forward. 
Process 
The preparation of this briefing document relied on existing Arctic Council networks and was 
open and collaborative. It involved contributions and input from more than fifty researchers 
affiliated to the Council’s Working Groups, policy makers, Indigenous representatives and 
Indigenous knowledge holders from all Arctic States and Permanent Participants. This group 
provided source material and helped shape the themes and issues that would be covered. The 
document itself was authored by 17 experts that represent all Arctic States. This work was also 
supported by a coordinating team, which included the Chairs of the Arctic Human Health Expert 
Group (AHHEG) and the Social, Economic and Cultural Expert Group (SECEG), the Executive 
Secretary of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), and an Advisor and the 
Head of Communications from the Arctic Council Secretariat. The process of preparing this 
briefing document provides a powerful example of the strength and capacity of the networks of 
experts and knowledge holders associated with the Arctic Council and their commitment to the 
Arctic Council’s work on Covid-19 in the Arctic. For more details about the process used to 
prepare this briefing document, please see appendix 2. 
Document Outline 
Part I of the briefing document looks at existing public health actions and activities across the 
circumpolar Arctic, while Part II focuses on consequences of the pandemic and public health 
responses. In Part III, core themes from Parts I and II are highlighted and mapped in relation to 
their contributions to the resilience or vulnerabilities of Arctic communities. In addition, ideas 
are explored about the role of the Arctic Council that are intended to inform a discussion about 
potential work that the Arctic Council is best positioned to undertake in relation to Covid-19 
in the Arctic. Finally, appendices have been included to provide 1) an overview of key resources 
Covid-19 in the Arctic: Briefing Document for SAOs 
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that informed each thematic section, 2) a more detailed description of the process used to 
prepare the briefing document, 3) a presentation of the interview questions provided to 
Permanent Participants and an overview of the individuals and organizations that responded. 
Before getting into specific impacts of the coronavirus pandemic in the Arctic, a brief historical 
overview describing past epidemic infectious diseases in the Arctic and lessons-learned from 
those experiences are presented below as a contextual backgrounder to the briefing 
document and its observations. 
Historical Context: Influenza and other epidemic infectious diseases in the Arctic 
Pandemics have repeatedly struck the Arctic dating back to medieval times when the Plague 
reached the northern hemisphere. Smallpox was a great killer, cholera was introduced, 
tuberculosis was and still is a devastating disease and various influenza pandemics have raged 
in the Arctic, the worst of which was the 1918 pandemic. Measles, mumps, polio, HIV/AIDS and 
the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 have all struck the Arctic before the occurrence of the coronavirus 
pandemic. The experiences of previous pandemics offer important lessons for today. 
Remoteness and immunity 
Being part of a small, remote and isolated community presented clear risks in the Arctic during 
the 1918 influenza pandemic, often referred to as the Spanish Flu. In Alaska, there were 
communities where the entire population died. The remote location of Arctic communities 
often means that the successive immunization that usually takes place in populous towns does 
not happen. Remote populations are particularly susceptible when the virus reaches them, as 
witnessed by many Indigenous peoples in Latin America during the smallpox and measles 
epidemics in the 16th century when the disease was introduced by the conquistadors. 
The result is often devastating. Moreover, it is not unusual that the later waves of a pandemic 
are often more aggressive. For example, the 1918 influenza pandemic reached Arjeplog 
Municipality in Northern Sweden as late as 1920, but the result was that the parish had the 
overall highest flu mortality in the whole of Sweden. Further, elderly Arctic people had lower 
immunity during the 1918 influenza pandemic due to limited exposure to similar viruses 1890-
1917. On the other hand, depending on the epidemiology of the disease, remote communities 
can also be spared due to being disconnected and never experience the virus.  
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Epidemiologic transition  
Biological and social contexts interact to influence the impact of pandemics. The mortality 
pattern has changed significantly over the past 500 years, and Western development has gone 
from rampant infectious diseases to more man-made causes of death such as cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. Life expectancy has increased, and our knowledge has improved. The 
Arctic, especially the Indigenous peoples, have a double burden in that a great part of the 
region remains in a pre-transition state of the epidemiologic transition. They suffer from a 
higher risk for pandemic influenza due to chronic underlying health conditions, infectious 
diseases such as tuberculosis, inadequate access to health care, delayed seeking of care and a 
chronic lack of basic infrastructure. The people in the Arctic, however, also suffer from the 
more modern Western causes of death.  
Epidemic pathways  
It is much easier for a virus to spread in the present-day, even to remote places. There were 
three main ways the 1918 influenza spread: among military that lived in close proximity and 
traveled all over the world, among migrant workers constructing railway systems, working in 
the forest industry and in mining, and with passengers arriving from long distances with ships.  
Indigenous peoples  
Indigenous peoples of the Arctic have almost always had higher pandemic mortality. Smallpox, 
measles, tuberculosis and the 1918 influenza were all more devastating in Indigenous 
communities. Many present-day communities have excess mortality rates from a number of 
infectious diseases, such as pneumonia, influenza, tuberculosis, chronic otitis media, respiratory 
tract infections, hepatitis B virus infection, sexually transmitted diseases, Heliobacter pylori 
infection, parasitic infections and bacterial zoonosis. Indigenous peoples in North America 
suffered disproportionally from the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009. However, Indigenous 
knowledge has been useful throughout history to allow for flexible and adaptive responses to 
pandemics and strengthened resilience. For example, the Saami in Scandinavia managed to 
evade smallpox infections due to a correct understanding of the spread of the disease and 
pragmatic action.  
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Health care organization 
Many Arctic communities experienced underdeveloped medical health care systems and 
infrastructure. As a result of the 1918 influenza pandemic, more medical professionals were 
recruited to rural areas, and health care stations were established.  
Local authorities and the state 
The local and state authorities and governments have responded differently during pandemics 
across the Arctic. The devastating tuberculosis outbreak forced states to act in the early 1900s 
with varying degrees of success. They allocated funding for nursing homes and gave grants to 
doctors to improve competence in diagnosis and treatment and building sanatoria. The 
interplay between local, regional and central authorities has been important.  
Communication and information 
During the 1918 influenza pandemic, the information communicated to the public was limited. 
Newspapers wrote surprisingly little about the 1918 pandemic and many did not have access to 
newspapers, and this was before the radio era.  
Equality 
The medical health care and social systems in the rural North had been marginalized for a long 
time when the 1918 influenza appeared. There was a lack of nursing homes, hospitals, trained 
medical personnel and equipment. Vulnerable groups such as the elderly and poor have often 
been disadvantaged.  
Vaccination 
Vaccination was the key element when smallpox was globally eradicated and is today an 
important weapon against many infectious diseases. It was often difficult to perform 
vaccinations in the vast Arctic regions with limited number of doctors and vaccinators. Law 
enforcement of smallpox vaccination differed between the Arctic countries, as did mortality. 
Arctic countries were slower to implement vaccinations in their northern parts.  
Community-based pandemic planning 
The experiences of previous pandemic planning show that communities, especially Indigenous 
ones, have been neglected in pandemic planning. Their unique living conditions and 
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experiences are important and collaborative planning leads to increased acceptability, 
feasibility and implementation of pandemic plans.  
Population data and projection 
Mortality, and to some extent morbidity, of epidemic infectious diseases have been 
documented in official registers since the 18th century. Knowledge about the numbers of 
infected and deceased are crucial for a correct understanding of the outbreaks. This is also true 
today. Inconsistent and incompatible data has always been a challenge, and there is a need to 
develop relevant indicators. Moreover, population projections are important for a correct 
understanding of the demographic future of the Arctic. Using the definition of the Arctic region 
given in the Arctic Human Development Report II (2015, https://www.sdwg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/AHDRIIFINALREPORT2015-02-24.pdf), the Arctic has four million 
inhabitants, and that will not change significantly in the near future. However, different areas of 
the Arctic will diverge due to substantial population growth in Alaska, Yukon, Nunavut, Iceland, 
Troms, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Chukotka, while Kainuu, Northern Karelia, 
Lapland, Komi, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Magadan can expect a population decline. This has 
a strong impact on future pandemics.  
Lessons learned from past pandemics in the Arctic 
• Arctic inhabitants experienced devastating effects from the 1918 influenza pandemic. 
Remote communities had the lowest immunity and were worst struck. 
• People in the Arctic are vulnerable to pandemics due to complex high-level mortality 
owed to chronic underlying health conditions, infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, 
inadequate access to health care, and severe infrastructure deficits.  
• In the past, there were fewer ways for an infectious disease to spread globally as 
societies were not as interconnected as today. Today we know that one mitigation 
strategy is to avoid gatherings of many people.  
• Indigenous peoples in isolated communities have a high risk of infectious pandemic 
mortality, but traditional knowledge has contributed to prevention. 
• It is very important to have sufficient, skilled medical personnel, equipment and 
localities for treatment of infectious diseases.  
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• It is important that the situation is actively managed by regional authorities, including 
health care and social care for children, elderly and others. The state has an important 
overall responsibility. 
• It is important to provide and disseminate information, advice and legislation from 
experts and authorities and listen and receive information from communities. 
• There is a need for equal access to health care and social systems in the Arctic to 
protect especially the most vulnerable from Covid-19. 
• It is important to give Arctic residents equal access to vaccination and to develop 
strategies for supply and delivery. 
• It is imperative to engage citizens in pandemic planning. 
• Population registers should be improved to gain demographic knowledge that is 
necessary for pandemic planning. 
  
Covid-19 in the Arctic: Briefing Document for SAOs 
June 2020 






Page 16 of 83 
 
PART I: Existing Public Health Actions and Activities 
Across the Circumpolar Arctic 
Part I of this briefing document addresses existing public health actions and activities across the 
Arctic. It includes an overview of available Covid-19 epidemiological data for the Arctic region. 
Furthermore, it contains a review on infectious disease monitoring and assessment and an 
outline of the urgency to harmonize data in the Arctic. Other sections discuss patient care and 
public health information sharing, awareness and education. The final section addresses Covid-
19 risk management and mitigation in the Arctic. 
1.1 Available epidemiological data 
To date, most Arctic jurisdictions have experienced cases of Covid-19. As with other regions, 
there is available information on local, national and international Covid-19 
cases. However, obtaining relevant information for the Arctic is hampered by the remoteness 
of the different Arctic areas. While Iceland is an Arctic State in itself, some other Arctic regions 
are part of larger jurisdictions, for whom data on national levels are limited. For these regions, 
specific information needs to be obtained on sub-national levels, if such sources exist. However, 
this is not readily available for all areas in public statistics.  
In addition, cities, towns and settlements in the Arctic are of highly variable living conditions 
and sizes spanning from, for example, the municipality of Anchorage, Alaska, with a population 
of around 290,000 people to settlements with less than 100 inhabitants, such as in Greenland, 
Nunavut and Iceland. Also, despite variations in the size of settlements in the Arctic, the 
number of small, remote communities is much higher relative to settlements in the southern 
jurisdictions of Arctic States. As the burden of Covid-19 may be quite different in a city 
compared with small settlements, nationwide or statewide statistics may 
not sufficiently reflect the relative disease burden in the Arctic.  
Incidence rates and case-fatality rates of Covid-19 are currently lower in Arctic areas than in 
the more southern regions of the respective countries. There are no clear explanations for 
this. One contributing factor may be focused and timely efforts by the local authorities with, for 
example, the introduction of travel restrictions and pre-travel testing, as in the case of Nunavut 
and Greenland. However, Arctic communities may be severely hit by the introduction or more 
widespread local transmission of Covid-19 as a result of the unique conditions in the region. 
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For example, housing conditions in many parts of the Arctic favor transmission of the virus and 
limited health systems may be overburdened, even with just a few cases.  
Worldwide Covid-19 updates can be followed on the daily-updated Johns Hopkins University 
Covid-19 dashboard [https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html]. A similar regularly 
updated website exists for Arctic regions (‘Covid-19 confirmed cases in the Arctic’) managed by 
the ARCTICenter at the University of Northern Iowa in the United States 
[https://univnortherniowa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/b790e8f4d97d44
14b10c03d5139ea5d5]. This page is based, among other sources, on the global Corona Data 
Scraper website [https://coronadatascraper.com/#home] that pulls Covid-19 cases from 
verified sources on national and local levels. In this dashboard, the countries differ in the levels 
of reporting, e.g. with figures from all of Alaska are available, but only some of the Arctic 
jurisdictions of Canada. Information from Nunavik in Canada is amalgamated with Quebec 
provincial data and is thus inaccessible. Unlike the Johns Hopkins worldwide dashboard, there 
are only absolute figures on cases and deaths and a cumulative graph of cases for the whole 
region, while the former contains information of different rates that facilitate comparisons with 
other areas. 
Based on the Corona Data Scraper website that, unlike the University of Northern Iowa 
ARCTICenter dashboard, contains population figures, the present figures (up to 14 June, 2020) 
for the Arctic region are seen in Table 1. This website does not contain all cases from the Arctic 
compared with the University of Northern Iowa ARCTICenter dashboard, but it allows for 
comparison of regional Arctic and nationwide rates. Figures from the Corona Data Scraper 
website may deviate from the more precise figures given by local authorities as shown in Table 
2. 
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Table 1. Covid-19 cases in Arctic regions. Figures from the Corona Data Scraper 
[https://univnortherniowa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/b790e8f4d97d4414b10c0
3d5139ea5d5 and https://coronadatascraper.com/#home]  accessed June 14, 2020. Population sizes of 
Arctic areas of Sweden and Norway from Statistics Sweden and Statistics Norway. 








Canada (Arctic)  121,630 16 0 13.2 0  
Canada (national)  36,708,083 98,399 8,107 268.1 22.1 
  
     
Finland (Arctic) (not given) 443 0 
  
Finland (national)  5,516,224 7,087 325 128.5 5.9 
  
     
Greenland (national)  56,081 13 0 23.2 0 
  
     
Iceland (national)  364,260 1,808 10 496.3 2.7 
  
     
Norway (Arctic)  484,546 374 3 77.2 0.6 
Norway (national)  5,367,580 8,628 242 160.7 4.5 
  
     
Russia (Arctic)  (not given) 29,478 196 
  
Russia (national)  147,500,000 519,458 6,819 352.2 4.6 
  
     
Sweden (Arctic)  521,829 1,176 (not given) 225.4 
 
Sweden (national)  10,327,589 50,931 4,866 493.2 47.1 
  
     
US (Alaska)  731,545 654 12 89.4 1.6 
US (national)  325,145,963 2,063,249 109,249 634.6 33.6 
The table shows that incidence rates (cases of Covid-19 per capita) as well as mortality rates are 
lower in Arctic regions than the total national rates of the countries the Arctic regions are parts 
of. Yet, there are marked differences in rates between the Arctic regions.  
Table 2 shows specific figures for individual Arctic regions and countries from local authorities 
and sources as informed from members of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme’s 
(AMAP) Human Health Assessment Expert Group.  
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Table 2. Covid-19 cases in some Arctic areas as informed by local authorities through the Arctic Council’s 
AMAP Human Health Assessment expert group (AHHEG) members by or through national data sources 
between June 7 and June 14, 2020.  
Region/ Country  Cases  Recovered  Hospitalizations  Deaths  







Nunavik, Canada 16 
   
Faroe Islands  187  187  20 (app.)  0  
Greenland  13  13  0  0  
Iceland  1,807  1,794  120  10 
Lapland, Finland  218      6  
It is unclear how accurately these figures reflect the circumpolar Covid-19 situation. Thus, the 
number of notified cases clearly depends on referral to testing, local testing capacity and 
availability, reporting of test results to central authorities, case definitions and more. For 
example, in Greenland during the beginning of the pandemic, SARS-CoV-19 throat swabs were 
sent to Denmark for testing, but are now tested in its capital, Nuuk. Still, samples from 
elsewhere in Greenland need to be sent to Nuuk and are therefore dependent upon air 
transport. Similar limitations in the collection of samples and testing capacities must be 
expected to apply to other Arctic areas.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Establish a better understanding of the unique conditions and characteristics of Arctic 
jurisdictions that may contribute to incidence and case-fatality rates. 
• Ensure that policy planning, development and implementation considers the distinctive 
impacts of the coronavirus pandemic in Arctic jurisdictions relative to what is 
observed at the national level by Arctic States. 
• Follow the pandemic specifically in Arctic areas and ensure that data on Covid-19 is 
organized and easily accessible at a circumpolar level.  
• Further develop websites and dashboards with underlying population figures and other 
data, similar to the work done by the University of Northern Iowa ARCTICenter 
dashboard. 
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_______________ 
1Johns Hopkins University & Medicine. (2020). COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and 
Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU). Coronavirus Resource Center. See: 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html 
2University of Northern Iowa (2020). Covid19 confirmed cases in the Arctic. Arctic Center. See: 
https://univnortherniowa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/b790e8f4d97d4414b10c03d5139ea5
d5  
3Davis, L. (2020). Corona Data Scraper. See: https://coronadatascraper.com/#home  
4Covid-19 cases by 100.000 
5Percentage of deaths by infected persons 
6Kainuu, Keski-Pohjanmaa, Lansi-Pohja, Lapland, Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 
 
1.2 Infectious disease monitoring and assessment 
With the current pandemic, there is a particularly urgent need to harmonize data, including 
analysis methods and the number of cases, recoveries, hospitalizations and deaths. Arctic 
regions face many of the same conditions and challenges regarding Covid-19, thus enhancing 
circumpolar and transnational collaboration, surveillance and harmonization of case definitions 
are important to control the pandemic in the Arctic. 
Infectious disease rates across the Arctic are highly variable, depending on country, disease, 
age, sex and location. Improved sanitation, medical treatment, vaccinations and education have 
reduced infectious disease rates and health disparities, yet Indigenous populations suffer 
higher rates of infections compared to non-Indigenous populations across the Arctic. All Arctic 
countries have their own guidelines, regulations and practices to monitor and collect data of 
infectious diseases.  
There are also a number of Arctic collaborative programs, such as long-standing monitoring 
programs in Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation (e.g. tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS) between Norway, 
Finland, Sweden and the Russian Federation, and many countries participate in World Health 
Organization (WHO) programs on infectious diseases. There are also monitoring networks, such 
as the Local Environmental Observer Network (LEO) led by the Alaska Native Tribal Health 
Consortium. The LEO network enables local Arctic inhabitants and topic experts to inform and 
share information about unusual and unprecedented environmental events (e.g. new diseases 
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and species). The Arctic Council’s Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) helped expand 
this network to become circumpolar.  
The International Circumpolar Surveillance System’s (ICS, since 1999) monitoring program 
focuses on a number of important infections in the Arctic populations. While it mainly focuses 
on invasive bacterial infections, it also includes other infections such as viral hepatitis, 
tuberculosis, sexually transmitted infections and Helicobacteri pylori infection. ICS is affiliated 
with the International Union of Circumpolar Health (IUCH), an Observer to the Arctic Council.  
ICS has collected information from all Arctic regions. During the last decade, there has been 
increasing focus on emerging and climate-sensitive infections in the Arctic. There are other 
networks and research projects focusing on zoonotic diseases, such as climate change effects 
on the epidemiology of infectious diseases and the impacts on Northern societies (CLINF: 
https://clinf.org/) and the International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the 
Arctic (INTERACT: https://eu-interact.org/) subproject. According to recent reviews and 
publications, differences in monitoring practices of infectious diseases exist. 
Infections, such as tick-borne diseases (e.g. encephalitis and borreliosis), tularemia, anthrax and 
vibriosis, midge-borne bluetongue and parasitic infection fasciolosis, are good candidates to be 
climate-sensitive infectious diseases that could be relevant for humans and animals living in 
Northern regions1,2. One concern of climate warming and permafrost thaw is that there might 
be a release of infective agents, especially anthrax from older burial places, that have been 
buried for a long time in frozen ground3. This joint approach of human and wildlife health is 
called One Health, which is the focus of an Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working 
Group (SDWG) project that has brought together experts to strengthen regional knowledge 
sharing and coordination across Arctic since 2015 (One Arctic, One Health, https://arctic-
council.org/en/about/working-groups/sdwg/). The One Health concept is also discussed in the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) scientific report on human health to be 
release in 2021. To follow the developmental rates of the infectious diseases in a time with 
marked climate change, a systematic surveillance program of these infections in the northern 
regions needs to be established.  
Currently, there are big differences in monitoring infectious diseases in the Arctic, including in 
nine potentially climate sensitive zoonotic diseases in the five Nordic countries4. A report of the 
registered data collected from health authorities showed incompatible reporting systems and 
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differences in regulations. Therefore, international standardization in surveillance and case 
notification is warranted. 
Significant differences in the registration of epidemic data are not limited to climate-sensitive 
infections but apply to a number of infections. Therefore, there is an urgent need for 
harmonization. The large data variability limits the possibilities to conduct multi-country 
studies. There is also a need to establish a joint list of reportable diseases by using the same 
reporting method to improve international surveillance and actions. 
Arctic State actions during Covid-19 
• The coronavirus pandemic has strengthened the already existing northern networks in 
the Euro-Arctic region, including between the neighboring countries of Finland, Sweden 
and Norway, whose health care authorities have moved from monthly to weekly 
meetings. Digital tools have been developed, and follow-up information and data on 
infection, medical care staff and other resources have moved into an electronic format 
so the regional authorities can easily share and have access to the most up-to-date daily 
information to inform decisions and actions.  
 
• In rural areas and small communities, it is difficult to collect data and share information 
because of the lack of access to internet and connectivity. Text messages and phone 
calls are used to collect information about the most sensitive population groups, like 
the young and elderly. 
 
• Governments have increased funding to support healthcare capacity connected to 
Covid-19, including for monitoring, testing, diagnosing, and health care providers.  
 
• Arctic States have established public information channels and websites focused on 
the virus infection. Arctic States are regularly updating these channels with the numbers 
of infection cases, deaths and intensive care.  
• Monitoring is happening on a circumpolar level, and is usually available at the regional 
level.  
• Challenges have been, among others, changing criteria on who is eligible for testing 
over the course of the pandemic, testing capacity and developing strategies and 
scenarios based on epidemiological models, especially in small populations.  
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Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Harmonize data, including analysis methods and the number of cases, recoveries, 
hospitalizations and deaths. 
• Ensure local surveillance of the virus to support control of the pandemic. Measures 
include access to testing and central registration of results.  
• Allow syndromic surveillance (surveillance of patients with symptoms compatible with 
Covid-19) to improve overall observation and understanding of the disease.  
• Make information available in a central location, such as a website that includes 
information on Arctic testing capacities and availability, case definitions, actions taken, 
experiences and best practices to help public health systems throughout the Arctic 
control the pandemic.  
• Improve coordination and synergies in the governance of experts working in this area. 
_________________ 
1 Waits A, et al. Human infectious diseases and the changing climate in the Arctic. Environment International 121, 
703–713, 2018. 
2 Omazic T, et al. Identifying climate-sensitive infectious diseases in animals and humans in Northern regions. Acta 
Veterinaria Scandinavica 61 53, 2019. 
3 Hueffer K, et al. Factors contributing to Anthrax outbreaks in the circumpolar North. EcoHealth. 17, 174-180, 2020. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10393-020-01474-z  
4 Omazic T, et al. Discrepancies in data reporting of zoonotic infectious diseases across the Nordic countries – A call 
for action in the era of climate change. International J Circumpolar Health. 78:1, 1601991, 2019. 
 
1.3 Patient care 
Patients infected by the coronavirus can develop very different physical symptoms, which can 
range from mild flu-like to serious lung infections. Therefore, patients’ conditions can quickly 
change and deteriorate, from low-risk to very high-risk. When dealing with a contagious 
disease-causing pandemic like Covid-19, it is important to isolate the infected from the 
uninfected. Furthermore, patients are encouraged - and in some cases mandated - to stay at 
home both to reduce the risk of spread and to not fill scarce hospital and intensive care unit 
(ICU) beds. Hospital capacity must be saved for the seriously ill, who need high-intensity 
technological medical support and skilled ventilator care. In an Arctic context, where long 
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distances to health care are common, this causes a significant problem that can lead to serious 
complications or death because of delays or lack of transportation services to health facilities.  
In many Arctic communities, access to acute medical and nursing care is insufficient. The 
health care systems depend on non-residents and health care professionals traveling in and out 
from other regions to provide services, which creates a high transmission risk. Further, relying 
on the transportation of very contagious Covid-19 patients to acute health care facilities not 
only increases the risk of transmission, but it is also very expensive. Policies are needed in the 
Arctic to address shortages of trained health care professionals and workers, and appropriately 
subsidize emergency travel within the Arctic, including across borders (see section 2.6 on 
mobility).  
Fortunately, the incidence of infection in the Arctic remains low compared to national statistics. 
However, this does not reduce the importance of planning transportation logistics in remote 
Arctic areas before they are needed. Access to acute medical and nursing care for those in 
remote places often includes air travel. For example, in Greenland, serious medical cases are 
flown to Copenhagen, Denmark, and cases in remote areas of Iceland are flown to either 
Reykjavik or Akureyri. In Alaska, Canada and the Russian Federation, large hub towns have a 
hospital or health clinic – a first place that people could go for medical health issues of concern. 
The common methodology to provide acute care to the seriously ill in remote Arctic 
communities is to fly the patients to hospitals in more populated areas. The local hospitals 
need to prepare and plan for a wave of Covid-19-related illness from all corners of the 
community. Limited number of respirators, ICU-space and isolation rooms make the 
community more vulnerable during the coronavirus pandemic.  
In some places in the Arctic, telehealth, including telemedicine and its underlying 
telecommunications technology tools, has shown to be helpful to support traditional health 
care during the pandemic. For example, in a remote Icelandic community it was impossible for 
an ambulance flight to land and transport a patient to an urban health care center due to 
extremely bad weather. The health care workers had to rely on communication via telehealth 
to take care of the Covid-19 patient. However, telehealth procedures and virtual care in the 
Arctic requires connectivity and appropriate technologies (see section 2.7 on infrastructure), 
as well as capacity to use it. 
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Another health implication is the cancellation and postponement of planned health checks 
and preventive visits. Delaying non-emergency operations as a result of Covid-19 is likely to 
negatively affect overall health and wellbeing of the Arctic peoples in many northern parts of 
the Arctic States, where there are already high mortality rates due to ischemic heart disease, 
cancer, chronic respiratory diseases and suicides (see section 2.1 on impacts on physical well-
being and mental health).  
Furthermore, concerns are rising about the virus and the measures taken against it, fearing 
they could cause long-term mental health issues. In the Arctic, where concerns about mental 
health and suicide are long-standing challenges, there is a particular need to reflect on the 
consequences. Fostering mental well-being must be an important component of a holistic 
approach to address the longer-term effects of the coronavirus outbreak. The Arctic Council’s 
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) project Local2Global 
(https://www.sdwg.org/local-2-global/) is one of these efforts. 
Human resources in health care 
Shortages of human resources in health care is a challenge in “normal” times. During a 
pandemic, this challenge can quickly turn into an extremely problematic situation. For example, 
in Bolungarvik in the Westfjords of Iceland, all the nurses working at a nursing home became 
infected with Covid-19. It was a traumatic experience for the small town, and some nurses who 
were infected while working dealt with self-shame and self-inflected stigma because they felt 
they had failed in their work. Crisis situations generated by the coronavirus pandemic affect 
human resources in health care on top of existing strains on medical capacity described. 
Support must be provided to health care professionals exposed to the traumatic impacts of 
Covid-19 and authorities must ensure sustainable health capacities for their health personnel in 
the future (see section 2.1 on impacts on physical well-being and mental health). 
Remote Arctic areas already face shortages of registered nurses and doctors. The coronavirus 
pandemic has required healthcare workers and training personnel to be reassigned to carry out 
tasks they do not normally do. This requires, for example, extra training for experienced 
registered nurses to work in intensive care. There have also been national calls to retired 
registered nurses, health care professionals and those who have left clinical health care to 
volunteer during the pandemic.  
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Health care infrastructure  
Remote Arctic communities suffer from infrastructure deficits. Not everybody in these 
communities has access to health care and acute health services. This is the result of a lack of 
funding to support effective and comprehensive training for health personnel – not just in the 
face of the pandemic, but also for general health in Arctic communities. Small, remote 
communities continue to face a host of infrastructure gaps, including overcrowded housing. 
For example, how does one enter quarantine when living in a single household with eight or 
more people? (See section 2.7 on infrastructure). Furthermore, during the coronavirus 
pandemic, it is important to be aware and practice culturally-appropriate care. One example 
to consider is funeral care, including cleaning and preparing bodies, which is often dependent 
on family or community members. 
Equipment 
There is not only a deficit in terms of human resources, but also of hardware, such as Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) kits. Equipment is a key element to containing the virus at the 
community level. 
There has been sufficient Covid-19 testing material in larger Arctic communities and support by 
southern regions to Arctic communities. However, in many of those communities there has 
been a scarcity of testing materials and long waiting times to receive supplies. In the beginning 
of the coronavirus pandemic, scarcity of testing pins influenced the spread of the virus in some 
areas.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Conduct research on why some people get mild symptoms and others get seriously ill 
from Covid-19, with a specific focus on why the presentation of Covid-19 symptoms are 
different in Arctic populations. 
• Assess how well telehealth supported access to health care in the Arctic during the 
coronavirus pandemic.  
• Learn from the experiences of health care providers in the Arctic during Covid-19 crisis 
and see how to enhance support provided to these workers in the post-pandemic 
period. 
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• Examine how the shortage of ICU ventilators was handled in different areas of the 
Arctic. 
• Map, analyze and strengthen the health care and emergency capacity in the Arctic. 
 
1.4 Public health information sharing, awareness and education 
Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, public health information, often shared via statements 
from chief public health officers and other top officials, is linked to government websites. These 
websites also link to the websites of other regional governments and Indigenous bodies, such 
as the Saami Parliament in the Finnish context, Norton Sound in the Alaskan context and 
Vuntut Gwitch’in First Nation in the Canadian context. Flexible methods of communication via 
radio, state broadcasted TV channels, press releases and social media are all noted as 
valuable in isolated and Indigenous communities. In particular, local radio channels are vital in 
the Alaskan and Canadian contexts as they translate and disseminate Covid-19 updates into 
local Indigenous dialects, so they are accessible to all community members, including Elders 
and those without Wi-Fi connections or computers. The use of near-instant methods of 
communication throughout the coronavirus pandemic, including through 
Indigenous organizations’ and government-managed social media accounts and Facebook live 
events with politicians and local leaders, have been central in conveying quickly changing 
information directly to the public. For example, in Alaska, up-to-date information is given 
on mobile testing centers, and questions and concerns from community members related to 
Covid-19 spread within communities are answered.  
Official Covid-19 guidelines and information on travel restrictions are released on existing 
government websites, generally in the format of press releases, audio recordings for the 
visually impaired and official statements. Some countries, such as Finland, responded by 
creating a centralized Covid-19 communications website. Covid-19 guidelines are also available 
through fact sheets, interactive infographics, flyers and online pamphlets for easy community 
dissemination. Finland has made Covid-19 recommendations and updates available in Saami 
languages while Canada’s northern territories have done similarly for First Nation and Inuit 
languages. Iceland has made Covid-19 information available in nine languages.  
Leadership in the American context has also addressed misinformation concerning Covid-19 
through frequently asked questions information sheets and press releases. The Canadian 
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government has also responded to news sources that claim that narwhals and whales could 
carry Covid-19 and infect Northerners through consumption. The government released clear 
statements that wildlife contamination is incredibly unlikely, and the Canadian national Inuit 
organization, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), has also released infographics on how to safely 
prepare country foods and assures Northerners that marine mammals and other country foods 
remain healthy food choices.  
Translation into local context  
State recommendations are translated through a cultural lens to the local realities 
of northern communities by regional and Indigenous organizations. As information is 
communicated to the public in specific areas, the complexity of the language used is adjusted 
and local examples are used to make it relevant and accessible to all community members. For 
example, regional and Indigenous organizations offer infographics in simplified English for 
suggestions on how to sanitize homes in the absence of running water and how to social 
distance while hunting. This information is available online in printer-friendly formats such 
as pamphlets and information sheets for dissemination in communities that may not 
have sufficient internet access. Many online resources also offer culturally appropriate 
suggestions on maintaining social contact during Covid-19. For example, Icelandic government 
websites suggest alternatives to handshakes, and Indigenous organizations suggest video calling 
Elders to maintain contact.  
Perception and response  
Public health recommendations are often written to suggest that keeping communities safe 
from Covid-19 is the responsibility of individual community members, which can be achieved by 
voluntarily abiding by public health recommendations. Messages like ‘do your part’, and ‘we all 
have a responsibility to keep each other safe’ are commonly seen on public health websites and 
social media resources. Various circumpolar partners have stressed the importance of having 
accurate and consistent messaging from community and state leaders concerning Covid-19 
transmission, as trust in leadership is noted as a key ingredient to ensure individuals abide by 
public health recommendations. Using pre-Covid-19 channels of communication was noted as 
effective when possible to reduce the time it takes to create new methods of 
communication and encourage public uptake. Examples of this include increasing community 
call-ins with tribal leaders to daily phone calls available to all community members.  
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The role of Elders in their communities also has an effect on how communities perceive Covid-
19. As keepers of historical memories, they pass on the lessons learned during past contagions, 
such as the 1918 influenza pandemic, and communicate the need for precaution to their 
communities. As such, oral traditions provide historical continuity to the Covid-19 pandemic 
and gear Indigenous communities to deal with future potential hurdles. A key example of this 
is an Alaskan partnership between Elders and local youth to record and explore the effects of 
the 1918 influenza pandemic on their community, ensuring historical memories and 
community resilience is passed on to youth.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Provide a variety of methods of communication to northern communities, such as 
radio channels and in-person resources. In particular, recognize that some individuals in 
the Arctic are missed through commonly used channels of communication as they do 
not have a phone line, TV or internet access. 
• Seek to understand how communities that are not connected to mass media solutions 
receive public health information and how this affects their response to Covid-19 and 
public health crises.  
• Focus on the effects of Covid-19 on nomadic communities that may not have 
consistent access to mass communication or necessary public services while maintaining 
conditions of self-isolation.  
• Draw attention to the perception of northern and Indigenous communities 
towards state and local government responses to the pandemic. Levels of trust 
between governments and the communities they serve should be examined to better 
understand its effects on public health recommendation uptake.  
• Examine discrepancies between what is understood to be essential services and 
resources by northern communities and governments. 
• Examine the use of public health apps to track infections and potential privacy issues 
surrounding this.  
• Use public communications case studies to assess and better plan how to convey the 
urgency and potential impacts of the pandemic to communities.  
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• Ensure continuity of cultural practices during Covid-19 and continue to maintain 
contact with Elders and hunt. This fosters mental well-being of northern communities 
and is a key factor in their continued resilience. 
 
1.5 Risk management and mitigation 
The Arctic States have taken different approaches and implemented varying measures to 
contain the spread of Covid-19 in their northern jurisdictions. Overall, it can be argued that 
most Arctic States and communities have so far been successful in managing and mitigating 
the spread of Covid-19 in their northern jurisdictions. In unitary states (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway and Iceland), national measures have guided the response and mitigation measures, 
while in federal states (and the Kingdom of Denmark) each level of government has had their 
own role in establishing risk management and mitigation measures. 
What is the reason for the low rates of infections we currently observe in most parts the Arctic? 
Remoteness is likely one factor, as the disease has not been able to spread as quickly into less 
populous, isolated Arctic towns and villages. Even where the national level response has been 
the key in responding to the pandemic, some Arctic Indigenous communities – especially in 
North America and Greenland’s self-rule – have closed borders to curtail the spread of Covid-
19. This is likely due to the historical awareness of pandemics and diseases among Arctic 
Indigenous peoples and regional health authorities, notably the 1918 influenza, raising the 
levels of alertness and concern within these communities (also see historical context in the 
introduction). In general, remote communities have an advantage in these situations since 
they can keep track of people entering their areas, which is nearly impossible in larger cities. 
On the other hand, if and when the virus is able to penetrate these communities, there will be 
many challenges to overcome. For example, there is no immunity to the disease, the capacity 
of the health care system is often quite limited, and rapidly transporting a sick person great 
distances to receive specialized care is difficult.  
In addition, many Arctic communities have a higher prevalence of underlying health conditions 
that are risk factors for more serious Covid-19 illness (see section 1.3 on patient care). Some 
regions, particularly the European Arctic, have proportionally more elderly persons than in the 
South. Furthermore, as is discussed in several sections of this briefing document, housing in 
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many parts of the Arctic is often inadequate – with small crowded houses or nomadic tents. 
This creates challenges for social distancing and hygiene.  
Because of these conditions and challenges, it is of utmost importance to put in place effective 
measures to prevent the virus from entering these communities. Even if infection rates have 
been low in much of the Arctic until now, it is important to recall that additional waves may 
come as states lift restrictions. 
The dominant approach taken by governments and organizations to date has been to control 
peoples’ movements so that the virus does not enter the community or the sub-region. The 
ability to maintain these restrictions depends on the type of Arctic community and its 
connections and dependence on the movement of people in and out of the area. For example, 
there are outbreaks in the Russian Federation linked to extractive industry projects, which 
expose dangers to the nearby communities and to nomadic peoples. In general, Fly-in/Fly-out 
(FiFo) and seasonal workers are seen as a potential risk, whether they are miners or working in 
the tourism industry. In Alaska, fisheries rely on outside workers, who can be seen as a 
potential transmission threat for some coastal communities. 
Most Arctic States have closed their international borders from unnecessary travel, which has 
played an important part in preventing the spread of Covid-19. Currently, as part of lifting the 
restrictions, governments are considering opening international borders for recreational travel, 
for instance in the Nordic countries – effectively creating travel bubbles. The Finnish and 
Norwegian governments have, from the middle of June (15 June 2020) allowed recreational 
travel to e.g. Norway, Iceland and Denmark without quarantine upon return – and allows also 
travel to their respective country from those countries. 
Perhaps unique to the region, some communities are encouraging people to go out on the land, 
to live in traditional ways to reduce the possibility of getting the virus. Some Indigenous 
nomads have historical experience of avoiding disease risk areas. Hence, for many nomads, 
spatial avoidance has been a key disaster response approach for centuries. 
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Produce specific information and gain knowledge of how northern and Indigenous 
communities have taken measures to protect against Covid-19.  
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• Compile and assess measures taken to manage the risk of spreading the virus in 
specific industries (fisheries, oil and gas, mining) and between these workers and 
nearby communities.  
• Document historical experiences about how Indigenous and local Arctic residents have 
reacted to pandemics.  
• Keep track of how easing national and local restrictions influences the spread of Covid-
19 in Arctic regions, and what measures are taken to manage and mitigate that risk. 
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PART II: Consequences of Pandemic and Public 
Health Responses 
Part II of this document reflects the multi-dimensional impacts of both the coronavirus 
pandemic itself, mitigation responses, and relief packages for Arctic communities and highlights 
the interconnectedness of health, social and cultural realities, mobility, multiple sectors of the 
economy, knowledge production, and the environment. It also brings out existing inequalities 
and vulnerabilities evident in rural and remote communities as well as the importance of 
developing infrastructural robustness to support community well-being and resilience. This 
applies to physical infrastructure such as connectivity, transport, health care facilities and 
equipment, housing and sewage, as well as access to life-sustaining resources, such as fresh 
water and food supply. Local communities have found innovative ways to adapt to changing 
and difficult conditions. For example, oral history, traditional knowledge and subsistence 
practices have provided many Arctic communities with guidance on how to manage risk and 
protect their most vulnerable. Many Arctic governments have already implemented response 
and relief packages, and these represent important short-term measures to mitigate the 
pandemic’s impacts on Arctic communities. Longer-term improvements of public infrastructure 
are an urgent policy priority if sustainable resilience of Arctic communities is to be achieved. 
2.1 Impacts on physical well-being and mental health 
There are many impacts on the physical and mental health and well-being of those living in the 
North due to Covid-19 and the measures taken to contain the spread of the virus. When looking 
at these impacts, it is important to acknowledge the interconnectedness of issues such as 
mental and physical health, and the dependence of healthy humans on a healthy environment.  
One area of concern, and at the same time a sign of resilience of Arctic communities during the 
pandemic, is food security. Food and nutrition security are always a major concern for 
Indigenous peoples. Unless they harvest from the land and sea, people in Arctic communities 
rely on grocery stores that get expensive food from distant southern locations. As 
the pandemic has threatened fragile supply chains, several Arctic national and regional 
governments have brought in supplemental, time-limited support programs to ensure food 
security. In addition, many schools have been providing lunch programs even while school is 
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provided virtually, which will in some cases continue into the summer to address food and 
nutrition security for youth.  
Moreover, in the face of the pandemic, a positive trend related to food security has been 
observed. Communities are looking to traditional/country food resources and improving 
gardening efforts to deal with food and nutrition security. In Alaska and Chukotka, whale hunts 
have provided a source of healthy food for communities. Access to country food is an important 
component of health and well-being for all Indigenous peoples. This in turn is linked to a 
healthy environment and points to the need to ensure the health and sustainability of the 
species on which people rely. People are also sharing recommendations on ways to stay healthy 
and lessen the likelihood of complications related to virus’ with traditional plant medicines.  
In addition to the issue of food security, the pandemic and measures implemented to contain 
the spread of Covid-19 cause and exacerbate mental health issues through 
elevated stress levels, fear and stigmatization. People fear contracting the disease and losing 
relatives, and the pandemic is also triggering the historical trauma of past pandemic 
diseases that wiped out whole communities. There is also stigma attached to the virus, 
compounded by the fact that many Indigenous peoples have historically felt stigma through 
colonialism, and the infection can leave a mark of disgrace for those infected in communities. 
In addition, unemployment is at historical highs, which hits rural communities especially hard, 
as there are already high levels of unemployment. The push to open communities to resource 
development and fisheries during the busy summer months has many concerned about their 
health.  
In order to address these issues, resources and information are being provided to citizens 
regarding coping with the stress of and well-being related to Covid-19, including being kind, 
ways to stay physically healthy and address mental health, as well as details on resources 
specific to families and children and first responders. A positive effect is also attained by 
empowering rural communities to stop or limit travel with quarantine policies in cooperation 
with regional airlines and industry partners. This ability encourages self-governance and 
empowerment of communities and makes them feel safer. 
Some of the steps taken to fight the pandemic, including social distancing and isolation, are 
foreign to Arctic peoples and they take an additional toll on people’s mental health and well-
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being. One example is the intergenerational physical distancing between young and Elders, 
something that is completely foreign in all Indigenous cultures and has been identified as an 
important issue by Saami, Aleut, Inuit and other Indigenous peoples. This separation causes 
stress for young children who cannot be with their grandparents, since these adults are often 
their closest relative and sometimes fill a parenting role. Isolation has created challenges to 
mental and emotional well-being of Elders who are especially isolated, and more so if in a home 
or assisted living facility. 
There have also been reports of increased domestic violence due to quarantine and staying at 
home for longer periods of time. Concerns of increased child abuse and neglect, as schools 
being closed take away possible oversight and intervention by seeing children in need. In 
addition, there are concerns of increases in substance misuse due to sheltering in place and 
the lack of ability to attend in-person substance abuse support groups.  
While connection to cultural activities would normally be a way to stay healthy, the lack 
of social interaction affects people. There are reports of social media fatigue and conference 
call burnout with increased use of technology related to sheltering in place. Many desire a more 
personal connection that technology does not give. However, some report that there has been 
a deeper connection to family, friends and colleagues due to physical distancing – as they are 
making time to call or video chat, which they did not before outside of work or meetings.  
The measures taken against the pandemic also create health care infrastructure challenges due 
to the heightened focus on screening and treating Covid-19. Many have had to forgo preventive 
visits that have affected vaccination rates, health screenings, primary care and elective 
procedures (see section 1.3 on patient care). Health systems have reported dramatic 
reductions in their third-party payor, insurance or Medicaid income that are affecting other 
preventive programs that could be resourced through this revenue.  
This loss of revenue has also caused delays in preventive maintenance and infrastructure 
improvements. The lack of access to higher levels of care in rural community health centers 
adds additional stress to those facing the infection. This includes medical care and access to 
hub community hospitals. The ability to collect data and monitor the public health impact of 
Covid-19 has been challenged and was already limited because of the lack of internet and 
connectivity in many Arctic communities. Those with access to internet and social media have 
more resources than those without, creating issues of equity when it comes to virtual support.  
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Finally, the coronavirus outbreak also underlines the importance of the environment. There are 
reports of air and water quality improvements along with less disruption to the calving 
season of sea and land animals due to decreased air, sea and land traffic. There have been 
more whales caught this season, providing nutrient-dense food to northern communities. 
Meanwhile, as we deal with Covid-19, climate change is still well under way and at alarming 
rates in the North. Alaska is predicted to have another warm, dry summer with potential fires 
ensuing. This adds to the mental and emotional stress. The need to keep up ongoing research 
and addressing infrastructure needs with a pandemic underway is a challenge. There is a need 
for the alignment of policies and best practices in order to control Covid-19 and promote well-
being in the Arctic States.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Establish emergency programs to ensure food and nutrition security for northern and 
Indigenous communities, including programs tailored to youth.  
• Heighten awareness about stigmatization for people infected by Covid-19 in Arctic 
communities and develop tools and support programs to reduce its impact on 
individuals.  
• Identify measures to reduce the vulnerability of Arctic communities that are in contact 
with essential and outside workers traveling to the North. 
• Empower communities to manage local issues related to stress and well-being during 
pandemics, in particular acts of kindness, healthy practices and support for mental 
health. 
• Develop tools to maintain health-related research and address health-related 
infrastructure needs during a pandemic.  
• Share best practices and coordinate policies to help control Covid-19 along with ways 
to promote well-being in Arctic States. 
• Monitor and address the potential increase in substance misuse due to sheltering in 
place and the inability of individuals to seek support through in-person substance 
abuse support groups because of physical distancing.  
• Assess how the coronavirus has impacted the environment and Arctic communities. 
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2.2 Impacts on regional and local economies by sector/industry 
The data on economic impacts on regions and communities in the Arctic is extremely limited, 
and thus the summary presented below relies on preliminary datasets, case studies and general 
understanding of economic processes in the region. It is evident, however, that the coronavirus 
pandemic has impacted Arctic economies. These impacts can be categorized as: 
• impacts of containment/mitigation/reopening policies (e.g., closures, cancellations, 
travel bans, quarantine, reopening regimes);  
• impacts on demand for goods and services (e.g., drop in demand for fuels, travel, 
leisure; spike in PPE, medicine, food) and,  
• impacts on supply (e.g., factory shutdowns, store closures, supply chain interruptions, 
labor force issues).  
In addition, the economy is affected by economic relief and recovery measures, such as 
relief/stimulus packages and regulatory changes aimed at supporting economic recovery. The 
impacts could also be viewed as direct (e.g., loss of revenue, taxes), indirect (e.g., adjustments 
in supply chains) and induced (e.g., reduction in consumer spending). Currently, observed 
impacts fall within direct and indirect.  
Although Covid-19 impacts will vary between economic sectors and among Arctic regions, most 
components of the Arctic economic system have been or will be impacted by the pandemic. 
One common characteristic of the Arctic regions is their reliance on global trade, and 
specifically on specialized exports such as oil, natural gas, minerals and fish, while also 
depending on importing vital necessities such as fuel, food, equipment and more. Thus, any 
interruptions in trade deeply affect the Arctic. 
Traditional economies  
As discussed in other sections, the current health crisis represents both challenges and 
opportunities for traditional economies. For reindeer husbandry, Covid-19 resulted in declining 
demand for reindeer products (it is still uncertain how the pandemic will influence the price of 
reindeer meat), and difficulties with crossing jurisdictional boundaries with reindeer herds 
under the restrictive measures (promptly addressed in most cases). However, the decline in 
tourism and extractive activities may reduce potential conflicts between reindeer herders and 
the tourist companies and lower fuel costs will help with the bottom line.  
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In many jurisdictions, traditional hunting, fishing and other activities have been exempted from 
some quarantine measures or recognized as ‘essential.’ In some areas, the role of the 
traditional economies in food security has increased and engagement in subsistence expanded 
as a result of the pandemic.  
The Indigenous cultural economy has also been impacted by disrupted markets and limited 
mobility of people and goods. Although some jurisdictions provided support to Indigenous 
businesses and related traditional activities (e.g., Canada, the Russian Federation, Finland), the 
lack of timely and substantial relief may result in losses extending beyond the economy itself. 
Resource sector  
The rapid and deep downturn in oil prices has created disruptions and reduction of oil and 
natural gas production in the Arctic. For example, ConocoPhillips is cutting North Slope 
production by 20 percent, and Novatek’s exports dropped by 28.4 percent1.  
Due to Covid-19-related restrictions, as well as declining demand and transportation issues, 
mining operations have downsized, shut down or struggle to resume. Fly-in/Fly-out (FiFo) 
workers have been severely affected by Covid-19 outbreaks causing interruptions (e.g., Sabetta, 
Varandei, Chayanda and Belokamenka2) and concerns over the spreading of Covid-19 to local 
populations. Some companies saw elevated operating costs. For example, the Red Dog Mine 
recorded a 11 percent first quarter increase3). In addition, companies halted or reduced 
exploration that can cause an immediate loss (e.g., exploration spending in Nunavut was to be 
about $115.7 million USD in 20204) and mass layoffs by drilling companies, but also undermine 
the long-term vitality of extractive industries in the Arctic. 
Fisheries are bracing for major impacts. Firstly, they rely on seasonal workers, and thus are 
vulnerable to labor shortages and Covid-19 spread. For example, the Bristol Bay fisheries in 
Alaska generates $1.5 billion USD dollars and employs more than 12,000 seasonal workers. 
Secondly, there have been issues with demand and transportation to Asian markets (China). 
Finally, maintaining Covid-19 safety on board of fishing vessels creates new challenges and 
costs.  
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Manufacturing and technology  
Manufacturing suffered from labor force issues, extra costs and supply chain interruptions. 
Among severely affected industries is fish/seafood processing, which faces both a potential 
shortage of seasonal labor and increased costs to ensure Covid-19 workplace safety.  
In other sectors costs were also considerable. Nornickel allocated over $140 million USD to 
combat the coronavirus outbreak and mitigate its impact on employees and local communities5 
and OneWeb, a communications company, filed for bankruptcy6. 
Transportation  
Transportation systems in the Arctic are critical for the local economy. Most jurisdictions 
instituted travel restrictions or bans that are necessary to prevent coronavirus transmission. As 
discussed in section 2.7 on infrastructure, the major impact has been on airlines. In all 
territories and regions, scheduled flights have been reduced or cancelled except for essential 
services and supplies, and maintained flights are routinely operated at a loss. Additionally, 
many of these regional airlines operate smaller, propeller planes, and earn significant income 
from flying charters. As a result, Arctic-based airlines are placed in a precarious situation. At the 
same time, selected Arctic airports, e.g. Anchorage, experienced a spike in cargo air traffic.  
Other modes of transportation were also affected. Although shipments through the Northern 
Sea Route increased by 4.5 percent7 and other cargo transportation corridors continued 
operations, many Arctic waters have been shut for tourist vessels for the summer and the rest 
of 2020.  
Tourism and Hospitality  
The lucrative aurora tourism industry, which brings thousands of visitors to circumpolar 
countries each year, was one of the first to be shut down, and will be slow to recover. It is 
estimated that the tourism and hospitality industries will face severe consequences resulting 
from travel restrictions, falling demand and seasonal labor decline. The direct economic 
impacts in some regions will be substantial, but indirect impacts may vary depending on how 
well the tourist sector is integrated into local economies. The most devastating impact may be 
in the cruise industry. It is expected to take several years for the tourism and gastronomic 
industries in the Arctic to return to 2019 levels.  
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Conversely, the Arctic may prove to be an attractive destination for tourists during and post-
Covid-19. It is seen as clean, safe and sparsely populated and remote, which tourists may value 
even more in the future. 
Retail sector and trade 
The retail sector is adversely affected by the pandemic and risk management measures. 
Generally, supply of goods to remote communities has been hindered by cuts in 
transportation and restriction on transborder trade. However, small businesses in retail and 
other service sectors are likely to be most vulnerable in larger cities due to high operation costs 
and competition8. 
Public sector 
The coronavirus pandemic will have a serious financial impact on the public sector. Falling tax 
and royalty revenues and additional costs related to the coronavirus pandemic may diminish 
government support for public services, institutions and businesses. The loss of public services 
and subsidies may increase the incentives to relocate. This said, in many Arctic jurisdictions the 
public sector and its employees, who often provide essential services, have been supported and 
received relief and recovery funds.  
Labor and human capital impacts 
Most Arctic regions recorded increases in unemployment filings and rates. For example, in 
Alaska, with the entire working-age population around 500,000, 65,000 people who normally 
would have been employed were not working by the end of April 20209. Covid-19-related 
unemployment hits women and young people especially hard10. Seasonal workforce will also be 
greatly diminished, affecting extractive industries, fishing, constitution, food processing, 
tourism and hospitality. At the same time, some critical sectors, such as health care, suffer from 
current or potential understaffing. Additionally, there are concerns that unemployment may 
trigger the flight of human capital, especially qualified workers, who will leave the region 
seeking opportunities elsewhere. This can further complicate the recovery and compound an 
already difficult demographic situation, as well as exacerbate poverty further11.  
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Relief and recovery measures 
Arctic jurisdictions implemented relief and recovery measures at the national, regional and, 
occasionally, local levels. The packages often include funds for unemployment insurance, 
support for regional and municipal budgets, loans and subsidies for distressed companies, 
payments to individuals, money for medical needs and more. Some contain targeted programs 
for Indigenous communities, reindeer herders, essential services (clean water, health care, 
food, connectivity, etc.). Examples include the US CARES Act (over $1.5 billion USD to Alaska) 
and Canadian Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) ($130 million CAD for territorial 
governments and an additional $45 million CAD for the Inuit land claim regions). Iceland’s 
economic response to Covid-19 is expected to reach seven percent of the GDP – or $25 billion 
USD. Regional relief and recovery initiatives have been approved by the territorial governments 
in the Canadian North, by the Russian Federation regional authorities and the State of Alaska 
(“Six Points Plan”), among others. However, economic response efforts are helping, but are also 
being reported as difficult to understand and with potential for inequity.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Focus on data collection and community engaged economic analysis, especially at the 
regional and local levels. More data are needed to develop a better understanding of 
the Covid-19 economic impacts in the Arctic. More data are necessary across the wide 
range of economic indicators and geographical hierarchies, but most urgently at the 
local/community level.  
• Assess economic impacts in key industries, including the resource sector 
(extractive industries, fishing), tourism, transportation (accessibility, costs), services 
(especially basic services, such as healthcare, retail, and public services) and traditional 
economies. Data and assessment of indirect and induced impacts is necessary. These 
include indirect changes in supply chains, adjustment in production and transportation 
costs, reduction in consumer spending and cuts in government contracting, etc.  
• Address food supply and food security in the short- and long-term. More 
understanding and action are needed in respect to the implications of the Covid-19 
pandemics food supply and security, including availability, affordability, and quality of 
food. 
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• Approach traditional and local economies as a source of resilience. Arctic communities 
may demonstrate strengths and resilience by relying on both traditional economic 
activities of the Indigenous peoples and localized innovative business solutions. 
• Prioritize economic diversification and sustainability for economic recovery efforts. 
Channelizing economic recovery efforts to support the diversification of Arctic 
economies and ensuring their sustainability to future crises may constitute the most 
effective and lasting response to the Covid-19 economic recession.  
• Improve physical, digital and financial infrastructure to attain higher resilience of 
economic and social systems in the Arctic, and support future development of local 
businesses and communities. 
• Focus on targeted, equitable, long-term and locally-driven economic recovery 
investments with an emphasis on most affected population groups, communities, 
sectors and regions. 
• Invest in local human capital, while providing safe and healthy conditions for the non-
resident labor force. Development and retention of the local human capital is a priority 
for the post-Covid-19 Arctic. However, relying on non-resident labor force is 
unavoidable in certain regions and sectors. There is a need to understand and 
implement measures and mechanisms for a safe deployment of these workers in the 
Arctic under current and future pandemics. 
_________________ 
1Staalesen, A. (2020). Novatek says new Arctic projects will proceed as planned, despite a sharp drop in LNG 
exports. Arctic Today, 13 April. See: https://www.arctictoday.com/novatek-says-new-arctic-projects-will-proceed-
as-planned-despite-a-sharp-drop-in-lng-exports /  
2Quinn, E., Sevunts, L, Leiser, M. (2020). Roundup of Covid-19 Response around the Arctic. The Barents Observer, 
15 March. See: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/6581  
3Lasley, S. (2020). Red Dog zinc output not slowed by COVID. Mining News, 23 April. See: 
https://www.miningnewsnorth.com/story/2020/04/24/news-nuggets/red-dog-zinc-output-not-slowed-by-
covid/6257.html  
4Georg, J. (2020). COVID-19 could have big implications for Nunavut’s mining industry. Arctic Today, 7 April. See: 
https://www.arctictoday.com/covid-19-could-have-big-implications-for-nunavuts-mining-industry  
5Nornickel. (2020). Nornickel updates on the business impact COVID-19. Company website, 30 April. See: 
https://www.nornickel.com/news-and-media/press-releases-and-news/nornickel-updates-on-the-business-
impact-covid-19/?dateStart=46800&dateEnd=1591912799&type=releases  
6Humpert, M. (2020). OneWeb Bankruptcy Leaves Plans for Arctic Satellite Broadband In Limbo. High North News, 
14 April. See: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/oneweb-bankruptcy-leaves-plans-arctic-satellite-broadband-
limbo  
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8Zamyatina N. (2020). Long-term effects of coronavirus: features of the north and the arctic. Vestnik ARGO, Vol.9. 
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2.3 Impacts on social and cultural environments 
Covid-19 presents a threat to the unique social and cultural environments of many Arctic 
communities – environments that were already under stress before the pandemic. The 
experiences of Arctic Indigenous peoples with past pandemics are important factors that 
contribute to their current vulnerability. Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.4 on vulnerable 
persons, the current risks to Arctic Indigenous peoples are further defined and reinforced by 
long-standing inequalities. For example, according to a report by the Canadian Library of 
Parliament on the Canadian Arctic, “52 percent of [Inuit] homes are crowded, and people are 
more likely to live in poverty, lack consistent access to enough healthy food, and have 
underlying chronic diseases (…).”1 According to the 2018 US Census data, 23.81% of Indigenous 
peoples in Alaska live in poverty compared to an overall rate of 10.8%.2 In Russia, low 
household income and education levels, poor housing conditions, inadequate sanitation and 
unemployment may translate into a higher risk of Covid-19 spread.  
Overall, these pre-existing vulnerabilities and inequalities have the potential to amplify the 
impact of Covid-19 in remote Arctic communities – in particular, Indigenous peoples’ ability to 
meet their social and cultural needs (e.g., education, cultural teachings, Indigenous subsistence 
cultures). However, while the current pandemic serves to illuminate the threats to the cultural 
and social fabric of Arctic communities, it has provided many opportunities for communities 
to demonstrate their resilience. 
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A traditional way of life 
The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), has called on 
governments to quickly provide subsidies to support the most vulnerable Indigenous peoples. 
At the same time, nomadic ways of life and land-based activities of many other Arctic 
Indigenous cultures, which include seasonal reindeer herding, fishing and hunting, may serve as 
a form of physical distancing or “lifestyle associated quarantine.” However, physical distancing 
between youth and Elders has caused distress for young children who cannot be with their 
grandparents and close relatives. As discussed in section 2.1 on impacts on physical well-being 
and mental health, these conditions are especially felt in Indigenous communities where 
multigenerational families are the norm and physical distancing has prevented family members 
from gathering and celebrating key milestones. For example, current restrictions mean that 
funerals and end-of-life ceremonies have been postponed and minimized.  
Remoteness and resilience 
Poverty and inequality go hand-in-hand in many Arctic Indigenous communities where 
distances and weak supply chains make many rural and remote communities vulnerable to 
disruption. However, while remoteness of northern communities presents significant 
challenges, it can also provide a means of protection from the pandemic. In many places, 
financial supports have contributed to stronger social systems and provided opportunities for 
people to engage in subsistence activity and have access to country foods. This, in turn, makes 
it easier to self-isolate.  
In the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, where more than 18,000 nomadic people live, there 
were no reported cases of Covid-19 by the end of April. The same was true for other Indigenous 
peoples in the Nenets, Chukotka and Taimyr districts. Infection rates in Indigenous communities 
of northern Canada were also very low due to quick action to restrict incoming flights to only 
essential workers and essential food supplies. 
Social relationships 
Cultural and sports activities have been canceled or postponed across the Arctic – from 
basketball tournaments in Alaskan villages to hockey leagues in the Canadian Arctic to annual 
celebrations like the Muskrat Jamboree in Inuvik and Toonik Tyme in Iqaluit. One of the earliest 
cancellations was the 2020 Arctic Winter Games, a multi-sector event that draws athletes from 
around the circumpolar North, and which was scheduled to take place in Whitehorse, Yukon in 
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mid-March. These events provide the glue for northern communities and their absence adds 
to mental stress and uncertainty about the future.  
Teaching and learning  
Public schools have closed, universities have shut down and courses have gone online in the 
Arctic. In many Arctic communities, the pandemic has also affected childcare and school lunch 
programs. However, governments and organizations in various regions have taken steps to 
mitigate the impacts on Arctic youth: 
• The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act in the United States 
provides funding and flexibilities for States to respond to the Covid-19 emergency in K-
12 schools and provides a variety of waivers for assessments, accountability, reporting 
and funding carryover.  
• In Canada, the national broadcaster recently reported “an explosion in informal, on-the-
land learning in the Canadian Arctic.” 
In addition, digital learning has been met with mixed success due to poor connectivity in 
some Arctic communities. As discussed in section 2.7 on infrastructure, this serves to underline 
existing disparities between the North and South. Although, once again, actions are being 
taken to support youth to participate in this new learning environment: 
• In Fort Resolution, an Athabaskan community, the school offered drive-in internet 
access to help students stay connected because a majority of the school's approximately 
105 students have no or inadequate internet at home.  
• The Mastercard Foundation provided Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) in Canada with $1 
million CAN dollars to help students make the difficult transition to online learning. The 
money was divided and disbursed by the four Inuit land claims administrations.  
Innovating through tradition  
The significant role of Indigenous oral history and knowledge, passed down from generation 
to generation in Arctic communities, has helped individuals and communities explain and 
understand the threat of Covid-19. Knowledge holders have traditionally helped maintain 
cultural integrity in the face of adversity, such as pandemics. In particular, hunting, fishing and 
harvesting activities are vital subsistence practices that enable resilience and adaptation to 
changing and difficult conditions. Specific examples include:  
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• The Gwich’in Tribal Council provided $70,000 to each of its community for hunting, 
wood gathering, traditional medicine gathering and other activities that fit the 
community response plan to Covid-19 over the next several months. These funds 
support Gwich’in who would not otherwise be able to be on the land because of the 
cost of wood and fuel, food, First Aid equipment, transportation and other items 
suitable to their situation and culture.  
• Social media has helped promote ‘culture as medicine’ in many Arctic communities, 
with traditional dances, drumming and wisdom from Indigenous ancestors shared 
online, despite the challenges of physical distancing.  
• Inuit-specific online activities have also been developed, such as the apps, websites and 
games created by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) and provided in Inuktitut and 
Inuvialuktun. These online tools include graphics to explain physical distancing and 
other pandemic safety procedures.  
• Traditional medicine and growing gardens have also gained interest. In Athabaskan 
communities, sacred fires are lit and tended by volunteers, which place the ceremony 
within the boundaries of physical distancing regulations.  
• Using film as a tool to share the impacts of the pandemic has also been explored. In 
Scandinavia, the International Saami Film Institute had invited Saami filmmakers to 
apply for small grants to produce short films about the Covid-19 situation. In total, 15 
short films have been funded and will show experiences of the lockdown and the virus 
in the Arctic from a Saami perspective. 
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Recognize the opportunity to redesign northern economies and address inequalities by 
making investments in communities, prioritizing basic infrastructure such as housing, 
water and sewer, internet and ensuring access to health care.  
• Acknowledge and address the challenges Arctic Indigenous peoples face from 
compounded threats to basic health, well-being and cultural integrity. 
• Support Arctic communities to implement innovative approaches to strengthen 
cultural practices during and after the pandemic. 
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• Ensure that frontline workers have knowledge of Indigenous peoples’ cultures and 
languages to facilitate equal access to services by all inhabitants. To support this 
objective, future cooperation could include healthcare education and strengthening of 
educational institutions.  
• Prioritize investment in education that takes a multi-generational approach and 
includes increased support for on-the-land activities and skill development as a route to 
resilience building. 
________________ 
1Fryer, Sara and Collier, Brittany (2020). Inuit Nunangat and COVID-19. HillNotes. Library of Parliament, Canada. 
https://hillnotes.ca/2020/05/26/inuit-nunangat-and-covid-19  




2.4 Impacts on vulnerable persons 
Vulnerable persons are defined as those who are disproportionally exposed to risk and often 
include children and youth, older populations1, individuals with a disability or suffering from 
mental health conditions or addiction, individuals at risk for suicide or living under abusive 
conditions, and others from a gradient of socioeconomic groups that may struggle to cope 
financially and mentally with the Covid-19 crisis. Vulnerable persons in rural or remote 
communities are often at greater risk due to limited access to health services and other 
necessary infrastructure. 
To help reduce the risks posed to vulnerable populations in the context of Covid-19, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommends adherence to strict social distancing guidelines, 
encourages routine handwashing and sanitizing and advises consultation and medical attention 
if symptoms do arise. While these recommendations are appropriate for the general 
population, they are often challenging to follow in many regions of the Arctic and particularly 
in remote Indigenous communities.  
As will be discussed in section 2.7 on infrastructure, in many Arctic communities, social 
distancing and self-isolation is not easily achieved due to chronic housing shortages and 
overcrowding of households. These conditions make self-isolation nearly impossible, thereby 
fostering the spread of communicable diseases such as Covid-19 between people who may 
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already suffer from pre-existing comorbidities. In some cases, housing shortages have also led 
to a growing homeless population who are disproportionately susceptible to disease. Support 
systems for the homeless, and shelters in particular, are often lacking in Arctic regions. Where 
shelters do exist, the demand often surpasses capacity, leading again to over-crowding. 
Housing conditions in many parts of the Arctic have created additional vulnerabilities in 
populations already susceptible to health-related inequalities. 
As was discussed in sections 1.3 on patient care and 2.1 on impacts on physical well-being and 
mental health, these conditions are compounded by the fact that in many Arctic regions, access 
to critical services and health infrastructure is limited. Health systems in many Arctic regions 
are overstretched under the best of conditions but the demands of Covid-19 are exceeding 
staffing, laboratory services, infection control and monitoring capabilities. The delivery of 
critical health services varies by Arctic State, but the disparities between urban centers and 
remote Indigenous communities are common and most pronounced. Whereas the more 
populated capital centers in countries like Denmark, Norway and Canada are proving relatively 
successful at providing critical health services, the more geographically dispersed settlements 
in the Arctic are being challenged to provide adequate levels of care.  
Adding additional complexity is the fact that air service in some Arctic regions has been affected 
by the economic downturn, which in many regions has interrupted regular service. With 
airlines serving as the ‘lifeline’ for many Arctic communities, the disruptions in service affects 
the delivery of essential goods and services. Limited connectivity and broadband service have 
also affected the ability of some communities in the Arctic to take advantage of virtual care 
services (e.g., telemedicine) in areas where there is inadequate health infrastructure. Poor 
telecommunications infrastructure has also affected the ability of Arctic youth to continue their 
education remotely through online services because most online educational services assume 
some basic requirements, including adequate networks, affordable and consistent internet 
connectivity and basic hardware and software for household users. Unfortunately, these basic 
requirements do not exist in many remote Arctic communities. With plans being made to 
extend on-line education through the fall of 2020, these students will continue to be 
disadvantaged by technological inequalities which may delay or even derail their educational 
goals.  
It is difficult to capture the intersectionality of factors and conditions that put some Arctic 
residents at heightened risk of Covid-19. We can say, however, that the risks associated with 
Covid-19 are compounded by the significant and historically entrenched inequalities that 
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many Arctic peoples continue to experience. When you consider the high rates of poverty, food 
insecurity, pre-existing medical conditions, crowded and unhealthy living conditions, lack of 
clean water, limited access to health care and limited information connectivity, the 
vulnerabilities become apparent. Yet, even those who are not particularly vulnerable at this 
stage of the Covid-19 pandemic may become vulnerable depending on the policy response.  
Policy responses to mitigate impacts of Covid-19 should also include a careful consideration of 
the impacts on the most vulnerable persons in society. The effect of this pandemic on these 
often-overlooked people has not yet been well documented neither in the Arctic region or 
globally. A case in point is “emerging evidence of the impact of the recent global pandemic of 
Covid-19 on violence against women and girls”2.  
Emerging data across the world indicates that restrictive measures – with increased stress, 
anxiety, loss of jobs and financial strain, coupled with cramped and confined living conditions – 
may be leading to an escalation in violence in terms of frequency and severity. Of particular 
concern is domestic violence, including coercive control, sexual violence and for children and 
youth as co-victims and witnesses to violence. These concerns are echoed across the world 
with reports of an increase in cases of domestic violence (France, Canada, Germany, Spain, 
United Kingdom, United States, Iceland3, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Denmark) and 
a higher demand for emergency shelters and in the frequency of helpline and emergency calls 
(Cyprus, Singapore, Argentine, Canada). At the same time, due to restrictive measures, 
essential services may be in a compromised state and unable to adequately provide for 
individual needs. Psycho-social support for rape victims may be disrupted. Rural and remote 
populations, including in the Arctic, may be disproportionally affected due to lack of access to 
essential services during lockdown.  
In light of what we know about the unique circumstances in the Arctic and considering these 
global trends, policy makers should place special attention on better understanding the impacts 
of Covid-19 on potentially vulnerable populations in the Arctic and how their actions can 
bolster the responsive capacities of Arctic communities and avoid the deepening of health 
inequalities and future dependencies. Arctic communities need to be supported to put in place 
effective measures to protect and support their most vulnerable. For example, the Canadian 
Government has injected federal funding (almost $100 million CAD dollars) into the 
construction and operation of 12 new shelters for indigenous women and girls and Pautuutit, 
an Inuit Women‘s Association, has called on the government to specifically dedicate some of 
these funds to Inuit women4. 
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Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Encourage effective policy action in response to the interplay between a lack of 
essential infrastructure and community resilience.  
• Develop and use common data collection tools and methods specifically targeted at 
better understanding of how the most vulnerable are impacted by the pandemic. 
• Share experiences and best practices between Arctic States, national and subnational 
levels, to facilitate appropriate policy responses and initiatives intended to protect the 
most vulnerable from “unintended consequences” of risk management measures put 
in place to reduce the impacts of the pandemic. 
• Promote initiatives between Arctic States that seek to strengthen communities and 
support their most vulnerable persons through innovative tools and approaches. 
 _________________ 
1 In the specific case of Covid-19, it has been observed that vulnerable persons include older adults, those with 
underlying medical conditions (e.g., heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, cancer). 
2 UN Women, 2020. Policy Brief: The impact of COVID-19 on Women. Retrieved online 02.06.2020 from 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/04/policy-brief-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-
women 
3 The Women´s Shelter in Reykjavík voiced a significant concern, supported by information from the Police 
concerning the number of reported cases of domestic violence in Iceland, where Jan-April 2020 showed a 4% 
increase in violence, 11% increase in domestic violence, compared to the three previous years. Further, that due to 
the nature of the cases registrations of cases may take place later, leading to a higher number of incidents than 
already reported. In almost all other infraction categories there was a reduction, explained by the ban on assembly 
and social distancing. 
4 Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada, 2020. Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada urges Prime Minister to reconcile 
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2.5 Impacts on knowledge production 
General Knowledge Production – Major Impact 
The coronavirus pandemic has majorly impacted research activities and knowledge production 
across the Arctic region and in individual Arctic States. Field research and monitoring have 
been significantly disrupted by travel restrictions and stay-in-place orders across Arctic States. 
In Canada alone, for example, Nunavut has put on hold all planned wildlife research projects 
and the High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay has been shuttered. In Alaska, national 
fisheries’ services data collection has been postponed due to the lack of available ships and 
travel restrictions. Even the circumpolar Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of 
Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) has faced significant interruptions. More broadly, significant research 
projects face critical gaps, including related to long-term data retrieval. Graduate students and 
early-career scientists face particular risks, as they often rely on first or early research efforts to 
establish their credentials. These interruptions have second- and third-order impacts as well, 
particularly to local economies. 
Nonetheless, many research activities continue, and some projects have adapted to the 
restricted environment. Research that can be conducted remotely continues largely 
uninterrupted, such as remote data retrieval that rely upon remote surveys, satellite or radar 
data (e.g., the International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic 
(INTERACT)). National fisheries’ services data collection in Alaska shifted its research methods 
to employ drones to capture data. Research experts highlight increased importance of hiring 
more local researchers and experts to continue vital research efforts and increased usage of 
citizen science, leveraging the capabilities of amateur scientists and public participation to 
mitigate research lapses and gaps. The International Arctic Social Sciences Association issued 
guidelines to members in response to the pandemic, including avoiding travel to Arctic 
communities and engaging and working through local communities to facilitate remote 
research. 
Covid-19-Specific Knowledge – Significant Effort 
Arctic States, territories and communities have proactively ramped up research on the impact, 
management, prevention and treatment of Covid-19. As a result, the volume of available 
information Covid-19 is notably greater when compared to previous pandemics. 
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Arctic States have invested significant resources into increasing research and knowledge on 
the pandemic, including related to medical and clinical trials and efforts to producing a vaccine. 
Governments are engaging in shared, cross-border studies, as evidenced by the Nordics, 
Estonia and Latvia “Nordic Health Data Research Projects on Covid-19"1 call for 2020-2022 
research proposals. More specific to Arctic communities, Indigenous Services Canada funded 
$250,000 to a Toronto-based doctor to examine impact of Covid-19 on Canadian Indigenous 
communities. The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) have also engaged tribal communities with focused funding 
opportunities related to the pandemic. 
Arctic States have invested considerable resources in sharing research on the pandemic, a key 
factor in producing comprehensive knowledge, responses and solutions. The U.S. CDC, National 
Library of Medicine and WHO run websites with regularly updated, dedicated collections of 
Covid-19 research articles to promote global knowledge production and sharing. The 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health keeps track of global Covid-19 research efforts through a 
map that identifies the intersection of topics and populations. 
Arctic Indigenous community leaders stress that research discussions, decisions and activities 
on and during the coronavirus pandemic related to their communities must include, recognize 
and incorporate from the start traditional knowledge and local knowledge (TKLK) to 
appropriately involve and protect Indigenous persons. Even so, Covid-19-related research and 
data gathering in Arctic communities – particularly in remote and secluded areas – carries 
significant risk. Indigenous community leaders and scientific and medical researchers 
collectively affirm that outside researchers must take particular care and precautions to 
prevent the spread of Covid-19, citing the disastrous impact of previous pandemics such as the 
1918 influenza pandemic. 
Impact on Arctic Council Meetings and Work – Mixed 
Covid-19 has produced a demonstrably mixed impact on the work of the Arctic Council. Many 
of the Council’s engagements, including a Senior Arctic Officials’ (SAO) and several Working 
Group meetings – such as those for the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) and the 
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) – have been shifted to a virtual format, 
while SAO meeting organizers are exploring possibilities for combined remote participation and 
voluntary in-person attendance for upcoming engagements. For some Arctic States, designated 
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representatives to the Arctic Council (e.g., Senior Arctic Officials) have been forced to split 
duties or divert attention away from their Arctic Council work to assist with emergency Covid-
19 tasks. Some Arctic Council Working Group projects scheduled for 2020 have been forced to 
delay or postpone planned activities to 2021, such as two Arctic Remote Energy Network 
Academy (ARENA) workshops and a One Arctic, One Health conference. Arctic-focused 
meetings beyond the Arctic Council have also faced cancelations, postponements or shifts to 
virtual format (e.g., Arctic Science Summit Week). 
Nonetheless, the work of the Arctic Council and its Working Groups proceeds. The Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness, Response (EPPR) Working Group is exploring Covid-19 impacts and 
lessons learned; in the case of EPPR, particularly related to search and rescue, marine 
environmental response and radiological incidents. Others, such as the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program (ACAP), had already taken steps to promote virtual meetings and therefore are 
less impacted by travel and gathering restrictions. In light of the pandemic, Arctic States 
recognize the need to more thoroughly explore and bring attention to Arctic health issues. As 
such, the Arctic Council and SDWG secretariats have highlighted health-focused SDWG projects 
such as One Arctic, One Health and Local2Global across websites and social media accounts. 
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Seek greater inclusion and funding of Indigenous persons, experiences, vulnerabilities 
and local and traditional knowledge as well as capacity building projects in Arctic 
communities.  
• Provide and facilitate citizen science opportunities for researchers and local 
communities. 
• Explore how interrupted research activities in the Arctic can facilitate accelerated 
work to enhance the research capacity of local communities and researchers, and the 
facilitation of related connections and solutions.  
• Promote collaboration and cooperation across projects to increase coordinated and 
integrated activities and solutions.  
• Explore new methods to enhance virtual access, data sharing and harmonization 
across research projects and activities. 
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• Facilitate involvement through virtual tool and creative solutions for meetings and 
engagement, including facilitating the participation of persons in connectivity-
challenged Arctic communities and community-based participatory research. 
• Address the lack of studies that explore the circumpolar impact of Covid-19. 
_________________ 




2.6 Impacts on mobility 
The current pandemic has constrained or restricted mobility in most areas of the Arctic, with 
implications for how local inhabitants in the North organize their everyday lives during and 
after the pandemic. As is the case in many southern areas, in the North, most regions have 
decided to introduce travel restrictions and quarantine periods for travelers coming into their 
jurisdictions as preventive measures. This has applied to international, inter-regional and 
sometimes intra-national or even intra-regional travel. As a consequence, mobility has been 
affected across the circumpolar region with implications to varying degrees. Mobility is an issue 
that is considered directly and indirectly throughout this briefing document. This section places 
attention on the importance of mobility in the Arctic and highlights key mobility-related issues. 
Living and working in the Arctic  
Mobility is a cornerstone of everyday life in the Arctic. Without mobility, traditional and wage 
economies in the Arctic are crippled. For Indigenous peoples, living on the land is their way of 
life – moving frequently about from place to place – based on the location of terrestrial and 
marine animals and plants for their livelihood (reindeer, wild animals, berries, herbs, sea 
mammals, fish, etc.). In addition, for decades people have been moving in and out of different 
northern areas to find work on permanent, seasonal or Fly-in/Fly-out schemes (including for 
example monthly-based shifts working in the Arctic away from home). Relying on extractive 
industries and natural resource development wherever those activities take them.  
Mobility in rural areas also involves traveling long distances for procuring goods – food and 
other everyday necessities – or waiting for deliveries to arrive in northern communities. For 
example, traveling is an everyday reality to reach or receive medical services.  
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Recognizing the unique Arctic context 
All Arctic regions have had to make exceptions regarding mobility restrictions because Arctic 
communities are dependent on southern centers for many goods and services. As a result, 
travel is often necessary to ensure that Arctic inhabitants have equal access to meet their 
basic needs. Exceptions have been made to allow essential workers to travel into these 
communities, including medical staff, workers in extractive industries considered necessary for 
ensuring production (oil, gas, minerals), and fisheries. 
Nomadic livelihoods and social connections 
As discussed in section 2.3 on impacts on social and cultural environments, northern nomadic 
lifestyles have felt the consequences of mobility constraints and restrictions in the Arctic. For 
example, Arctic inhabitants with family members living on either side of Arctic borders – or in 
some cases intra-national jurisdictions – have been especially impacted. In Sápmi, all non-
essential border crossings between the four Nordic countries has been suspended. While 
these restrictions were lifted in June 2020 for the Saami, the border to the Russian Federation 
remains closed until further notice. This means that visits for cultural exchange are banned, 
relatives, partnerships, events etc. among Nordic and Russian Saami are suspended for an 
undetermined period.  
Mobility can also be understood as an asset for Indigenous peoples that rely on subsistence as 
a risk-minimizing strategy. In this respect, enabling mobility for subsistence purposes is 
important in areas of the Arctic where the coronavirus pandemic is not present. Support for 
subsistence mobility also means avoiding unnecessary mobility into settlements where 
people may contract the virus. Evading has been a traditional strategy for centuries for 
Indigenous peoples when dealing with problems including but not limited to health. In many 
circumstances, funding has been provided for exceptional mobility measures to allow people 
to be out on the land to avoid infection.  
Mitigating the risk of virus spread  
In the Russian, Alaskan and Canadian Arctic regions, one key concern has been that labour 
mobility, especially for the extractive industries, can make Arctic areas vulnerable to the 
spreading of Covid-19. The dependence on seasonal, Fly-in/Fly-out workers raises concerns 
when travel restrictions are lifted. Interactions between these workers and local (Indigenous) 
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population increases the risk of spreading the virus, if appropriate risk management measures 
are not implemented and/or respected. In several Arctic jurisdictions, isolation measures for 
transient workforces in the Arctic have been put in place to prevent the spread of the virus to 
local populations.  
Similar considerations are also relevant for tourism in the Arctic. The mobility of infected 
tourists bringing the virus to Arctic communities is a grave concern in all Arctic areas today. 
Many authorities, even in very remote areas such as Nunavut, have closed their jurisdiction to 
outside tourists for the 2020 summer season.  
Knowledge gaps and areas for potential action 
• Refine policies and rules to restrict longitudinal (North-South) mobility and enable 
latitudinal (North-North) mobility.  
• Assess the long-term implications of transportation infrastructure (air, water, land), 
including patterns, dependencies and the risk of spreading the virus in the Arctic.  
• Develop and fund innovative measures to enhance people’s capacity for self-
sufficiency while North-South mobility measures are in force (e.g., enhancing traditional 
harvesting and herding practices). 
• Recognize Indigenous traditional modes of transportation such as dog teams, reindeer, 
horses and respectively designed carriages (sledges, pulkas, etc.) and ways of travelling 
on the land to increase the prestige of such knowledge.  
• Maintain and strengthen connections between very rural/isolated areas and life-
support/life-saving essential services in the Arctic, especially with regard to air and 
marine transportation in times of crises in the Arctic (i.e., remaining operational despite 
the loss of profit).  
• Develop innovative policies and measures to encourage and support northerners to 
move out on the land for their traditional livelihoods in times of crises, as a means to 
reduce the vulnerability of Arctic communities.  
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2.7 Enabling public infrastructure 
Infrastructure limitations in many parts of the Arctic have been a long-standing threat to health, 
safety and overall resilience. As was discussed in sections 1.3 on patient care and 2.1 on 
impacts on physical well-being and mental health, responding to the coronavirus pandemic in 
the Arctic requires a careful assessment and understanding of the region’s limited health 
infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, health clinics, laboratories, etc.). In addition, initial actions taken 
by governments and organizations at all levels (national, sub-national, local) to respond to the 
pandemic have highlighted the need to strengthen all aspects of the region’s ‘critical 
infrastructure’ – the essential assets and systems that support the physical, social and economic 
well-being of citizens.  
The Arctic is not homogeneous, and the extent and condition of critical infrastructure services 
vary widely across Arctic geographies. However, based on the input of experts and knowledge 
holders, the coronavirus pandemic has exposed the fragility of existing critical infrastructure in 
the region, especially in many Indigenous communities. For these communities, the limitations 
of such critical infrastructure during a crisis dramatically compounds existing risks and 
vulnerabilities and highlights the urgent need to build more resilient systems. 
For example, many remote Arctic communities are highly dependent on air transportation for 
essential supplies (e.g. food, medical supplies, fuel, equipment) and essential travel. 
Restrictions and reductions in flights have quickly increased the cost of travel and transporting 
cargo, created delays in supply chains and, in some cases, challenged the economic viability of 
the airlines that serve these communities. The pandemic has exposed how great distances and 
a dependence upon tenuous transportation systems can increase risk to food and energy 
security in Arctic communities. 
Stresses on inadequate water, waste management, housing and telecommunications 
infrastructure in remote Arctic communities have also been amplified by the demands of a 
pandemic response, increasing risk to the health and safety of families. These conditions are 
especially acute in many Indigenous communities. For example: 
• Regular handwashing and sanitation are the most effective defenses against Covid-19, but 
these measures are far less viable in Arctic communities with limited access to fresh water 
and/or dependence on over-subscribed trucked water supplies. Similarly, many remote 
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communities do not have sewer and waste management systems that enable people to 
follow recommended isolation and containment protocols; 
• Inadequate, overcrowded, unaffordable and unsafe housing is another longstanding 
infrastructure gap in many parts of the Arctic. In addition, homes are often 
multigenerational, which brings increased risk to Elders and people with underlying health 
conditions. If Covid-19 spreads to Arctic communities, the inability to appropriately isolate 
infected or highly vulnerable individuals could lead to rapid community transmission and 
higher mortality; and, 
• The availability and quality of internet and telecommunication systems has allowed people 
around the world to continue work and education, seek essential services, maintain social 
contact and receive critical information about policies and programs related to Covid-19 
response. Unfortunately, many parts of the Arctic do not have access to reliable, 
affordable telecommunications services (i.e. telephone, internet, television). At a time 
when the need for telecommunications systems is greater than ever, increased demand has 
degraded services and left Arctic communities without the important lifeline that is keeping 
the rest of the world connected. 
To their credit, local, regional and national governments and organizations are demonstrating 
an awareness of the critical infrastructure gaps and weaknesses that exist in the Arctic and have 
taken steps to mitigate them. Governments have committed funds to support transportation 
infrastructure (e.g. funding airlines to maintain regular service to remote communities) and 
temporary housing (e.g. for self-isolation and shelters for homeless and vulnerable 
populations), used subsidies to address the rising costs of food and essential items, limited cost 
increases for energy and telecommunications and instituted special measures to reduce the risk 
of infection from outside sources (e.g. 14-day self-isolation requirements, delaying cruise ship 
season, requiring advance testing of essential workers).  
These actions represent important short-term measures that mitigate the pandemic’s health, 
social and economic impacts on Arctic communities. However, the “stress-test” of these 
unprecedented events has exposed the urgent need for improved public infrastructure in order 
to build the long-term resilience of Arctic communities. International agreements such as the 
UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the UN’s Agenda 2030 for Sustainable 
Development, and the Arctic Resilience Action Framework provide guidance for addressing 
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these limitations, but the pandemic has amplified the urgency of doing so on an accelerated 
timeline. 
Knowledge gaps and potential areas for future action 
• Initiate a critical and thorough regional examination of the infrastructure gaps and 
weaknesses that have amplified, and been amplified by, the pandemic. 
• Increase community capacity to identify and test new water, waste management, energy 
and housing solutions that meet their needs. 
• Subsidize the option for communities to safely and securely disperse away from disease 
vectors such as airports, roads, or crowded facilities during the pandemic. 
• Increase community capacity to respond to an infrastructure crisis without outside 
assistance by providing training and youth leadership opportunities. 
• Develop a regional action plan for overcoming the inequity issues caused by lack of 
broadband access during disaster response or pandemic emergencies. 
• Require Arctic investors to contribute to community infrastructure resilience as a “cost of 
doing business” in the region and incentivize green, resilient investments. 
• Establish regional milestones for dramatically increasing housing stock for under-served 
Arctic communities. 
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PART III: Core Themes and Guidance for the Arctic 
Council 
Parts I and II introduce a broad range of topics – from Covid-19 infection rates in the Arctic to 
pandemic containment strategies; from the impact of the pandemic on different Arctic 
industries to the efforts of Indigenous communities to maintain cultural practices. Overall, this 
briefing document discusses the unique conditions and characteristics of pandemic 
management and the direct and indirect impacts of the pandemic on Arctic communities.  
Core themes that emerge throughout the document include: 
• The value of enhancing international collaborations to support research and policy 
actions for current and future pandemic realities; 
• The necessity of ensuring that Arctic peoples lead efforts to define and respond to their 
communities’ needs (emergency response, relief measures, health and social care, 
infrastructure); 
• The impact of fragile, sub-standard or absent critical physical and social infrastructure 
(health care, water and sewage, housing, telecommunications, education, energy, 
transportation); 
• The unique health and social needs and circumstances of Arctic inhabitants, including 
the value and relevance of Indigenous traditional practices (social, cultural and 
economic); 
• The importance of data consistency, information sharing, observation and research 
across the Arctic with particular attention to strengthening local involvement and 
capacity; 
• The need to foster and contribute to the resilience of Arctic communities (economic 
diversification, cultural integrity, social vitality and environmental sustainability). 
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Figure 1 highlights key issues drawn from the information collected. It also emphasizes the 
many interconnections observed between these issues. Ultimately, this Figure encourages us to 
consider where the pandemic exposes or exacerbates the vulnerabilities of Arctic 
communities and where it serves to display or inspire resilience. It demonstrates that Arctic 
institutions should focus their attention on where they can contribute to reducing vulnerability 
and enhancing resilience.  
Each section in Parts I and II also conclude with a segment on “Knowledge gaps and areas for 
potential action.” Here, authors present specific ideas for how our understanding of Covid-19 
in the Arctic may be improved and opportunities to take action. This cumulative list of issues is 
not intended to be exhaustive; however, it is extensive.  
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The authors invite Arctic governments and organizations to consider these ideas and how 
they might inform their efforts in the short-, medium and longer-term.  
This briefing document was prepared to support an informed discussion by SAOs about the role 
the Arctic Council can play in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic. Given the mandate of the 
Arctic Council and the expertise that it has developed over 20 years, the Arctic Council has an 
opportunity to inform pandemic management in the Arctic and contribute to the enhanced 
resilience of Arctic communities moving forward. 
In particular, the Arctic Council is well positioned to consider the following: 
Role of the Arctic Council Potential Activities 
Build and strengthen circumpolar 
networks of experts and knowledge 
holders to develop common measures 
and share information 
• Leverage existing Arctic Council networks of 
expertise within areas related to health and 
well-being;  
• Strengthen the strong cross-sectoral and 
inter-disciplinary collaboration between 
Working Group experts;  
• Connect Arctic Council and other 
circumpolar networks, including the four 
regional councils of northern Europe, the 
Arctic Mayors Forum and other external 
bodies based in other regions of the Arctic. 
Initiate, continue or modify high quality 
assessments and continuous monitoring 
• Arctic resilience; 
• Arctic infrastructure (health, transportation, 
water and sewer, housing, energy); 
• Emergency planning and response for 
pandemics in the Arctic; 
• Arctic telecommunications and connectivity; 
• Biodiversity and human health; 
• Health and well-being; 
• Education and capacity development; 
• Community dependencies and self-
sufficiency; 
• Risk communication. 
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Facilitate and share learning from Arctic 
innovations and best practices 
• Sustainable energy; 
• Food & nutrition security; 
• Water and waste management; 
• Pandemic response;  
• Sustaining social and cultural practices. 
Enable and encourage circumpolar 
projects & initiatives 
• Human health; 
• Infrastructure; 
• Pandemic scenario planning. 
Draw on research, traditional and local 
knowledge and experience to develop 
recommendations to inform policies 
and programs of Arctic governments 
and organizations during and post-
pandemic 
• Patient care; 
• Community emergency response; 
• Infrastructure planning and investment; 
• Economic revitalization and diversification; 
• Communications and information 
dissemination; 
• Supporting vulnerable populations. 
Facilitate and encourage policy 
consistency and alignment across Arctic 
• Health measures and data collection; 
• Transboundary mobility and movement of 
Arctic peoples; 
• Pandemic risk management measures and 
procedures. 
This list is intended to provide ideas and inspire discussion. Based on this briefing document, 
SAOs have the opportunity to provide direction about what role they see the Arctic Council 
assuming and where more information and analysis may be required to support their 
decision-making.
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Appendices – Additional Information 
Appendix 1 – Links to supporting materials by thematic section 
 
Part I: Existing Public Health Actions & Activities Across the Circumpolar Arctic 
Infectious disease monitoring and assessment 
• Arctic Covid-19 Tracker. ARCTICenter, University of Northern Iowa. (2020). 
https://univnortherniowa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/b790e8f4d97d4414b1
0c03d5139ea5d5 
• Finnish Covid-19 tracker with information provided by THL. (2020). 
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/d40b2aaf08be4b9c8ec38de30b714f26 
• Covid-19 self-diagnostic in Finnish Lapland. (2020). http://www.sosiaalikollega.fi/virtu.fi/ 
• Covid-19 self-diagnostic in Canada. (2020). https://ca.thrive.health/covid19/en 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 
• Canada Covid-19 Situational Awareness Dashboard. (2020). 
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/2f1a13ca0b29422f9b34660f0b705043/ 
• Norway Covid-19 database. FHI. (2020). https://www.fhi.no/sv/smittsomme-
sykdommer/corona/dags--og-ukerapporter/dags--og-ukerapporter-om-koronavirus/ 
• Confirmed Corona infections in Sweden. Folkhälsömyndigheten. (2020). 
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/09f821667ce64bf7be6f9f87457ed9aa 
• Nordforsk Centre of Excellence CLINF (Climate change Effects on the Epidemiology of Infectious 
Diseases and the Impacts on Northern Societies. (2020). https://clinf.org/about-clinf/ 
• Case study on how Covid-19 spreads: Iceland. (2020). Iceland Monitor (with link to academic article 
in The New England Journal of Medicine). 
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2020/04/15/article_on_covid_19_in_iceland_in_new_en
gland_journ/ 
• CommunityFirst Covid-19 Roadmap (2020) is a 3-step online planning tool to support Indigenous 
communities to Organize, Prepare and Respond to Covid-19. (also available in Inuktitut). 
https://www.communityfirstcovid19.org/ 
• Guidelines on data sharing under Covid-19 circumstances aimed at stakeholders and/or 
policymakers produced by Research Data Alliance (RDA) (2020). https://www.rd-
alliance.org/groups/rda-covid19 
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• Virtual Conference on Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Woodrow Wilson Center. (video, May 2020). 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/virtual-conference-covid-19-impacts-arctic 
• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Arctic Council news article on Biodiversity and Human Health: Less Biodiversity, More Infectious 
Diseases? (May 2020). https://arctic-council.org/en/news/biodiversity-and-human-health-less-
biodiversity-more-infectious-diseases/ 
• Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists proposes a Standardized surveillance case 
definition and national notification for 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (2020).  
• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National 
Research University of the Russian Federation. (2020).  
• Alaska Coronavirus Response Hub. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-
dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 




• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html    
• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-
dhss.hub.arcgis.com 
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. Data, Statistics and Publications on MCH 
Epidemiology, Covid-19 Related Surveys. (2020). 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 Response Trust Grant Program established for beneficiaries facing complications 
operating and providing critical services during the Covid-19 pandemic. Alaska Mental Health 
Trust. (2020). https://alaskamentalhealthtrust.org/alaska-mental-health-trust-
authority/grants/covid-19-response-grant-program/ 
Covid-19 in the Arctic: Briefing Document for SAOs 
June 2020 






Page 66 of 83 
 
• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National 
Research University of the Russian Federation. (2020).  
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. (2020). 
https://yukon.ca/covid-19 
• Covid-19 in Canada’s North – Situation Report. (May 2020).  
 
Available epidemiological data 
• Arctic Covid-19 Tracker. ARCTICenter, University of Northern Iowa. (2020). 
https://univnortherniowa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/b790e8f4d97d4414b1
0c03d5139ea5d5 
• U.S. National Institute of Health Covid-19 clinical trials projects. (2020). 
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?cond=COVID-19 
• Case study on how Covid-19 spreads: Iceland. (2020). Iceland Monitor (with link to academic article 
in The New England Journal of Medicine). 
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2020/04/15/article_on_covid_19_in_iceland_in_new_en
gland_journ/ 
• International Circumpolar Surveillance program of invasive bacterial diseases is an infectious 
disease surveillance network of Arctic countries established by the Government of Canada. (2020). 
https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/surveillance/international-circumpolar-system-
invasive-bacterial-diseases.html 
• Covid-19 information site in Iceland. (2020). https://www.covid.is/english 
• Case study on how Covid-19 spreads: Iceland. (2020). Iceland Monitor (with link to academic article 
in The New England Journal of Medicine). 
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2020/04/15/article_on_covid_19_in_iceland_in_new_en
gland_journ/ 
• Iceland’s DeCode Genetics tests for Covid-19 immunity. Focus on specific groups, starting with 
people who have had confirmed infections, then going on to folks who have been quarantined. 
(2020). https://www.decode.com/  
• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html   
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• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. Data, Statistics and Publications on MCH 
Epidemiology, Covid-19 Related Surveys. (2020). 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/default.aspx 
• Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists proposes a Standardized surveillance case 
definition and national notification for 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (2020).  
• Finland provides nation-wide epidemiological data collected by the Finnish Institute of Health and 
Welfare. In the Northern part of Finland limitations were observed in the availability of testing 
equipment but has since then been improved. (2020). https://thl.fi/en/web/infectious-
diseases/what-s-new/coronavirus-COVID-19-latest-updates  
• Government of Canada Covid-19 infection data in the Territories. (2020). 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/phac-aspc/documents/services/diseases/2019-novel-
coronavirus-infection/surv-covid19-epi-update-eng.pdf  
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. (2020). 
https://yukon.ca/covid-19 
• Covid-19 situation in Nunavik, Northern Québec (Canada). INSPQ. (2020). 
https://www.inspq.qc.ca/en 
 
Public health information sharing, awareness and education 
• Arctic Slope Native Association / Samuel Simmonds Memorial Hospital Covid-19 information 
(Alaska) (2020). https://arcticslope.org/about/ssmh-governing-committee/ 
• Covid-19 information of the Maniilaq Service Area in Alaska. (2020). 
https://www.maniilaq.org/covid-19/ 
• Norton Sound Health Cooperation Covid-19 information in Alaska 
https://www.nortonsoundhealth.org/category/covid-19/ and recommendations related to 
subsistence during Covid-19. (2020). https://www.nortonsoundhealth.org/wp-
content/uploads/COVID19-Subsistence-Safety.pdf 
• Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation Covid-19 response. (2020). https://www.ykhc.org/covid-19/ 
• CommunityFirst Covid-19 Roadmap (2020) is a 3-step online planning tool to support Indigenous 
communities to Organize, Prepare and Respond to Covid-19. (also available in Inuktitut). 
https://www.communityfirstcovid19.org/ 
• Covid-19 information site in Iceland. (2020). https://www.covid.is/english 
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• Iceland’s Directorate of Health Covid-19 hub, with daily press conferences held by the police, 
Directorate of Health and the Chief Epidemiologist. (2020). 
https://www.landlaeknir.is/koronaveira/english/ 
• Status reports by the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, Department of Civil 
Protection and Emergency Management. (2020). https://www.almannavarnir.is/tag/raudi-
krossinn/ (in Icelandic)  
• Case study on how Covid-19 spreads: Iceland. (2020). Iceland Monitor (with link to academic article 
in The New England Journal of Medicine). 
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2020/04/15/article_on_covid_19_in_iceland_in_new_en
gland_journ/ 
• Letter of advice from a doctor: fellows from Chukotka living in settlements and in reindeer herding 
camps. (2020).  
• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html  
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. Data, Statistics and Publications on MCH 
Epidemiology, Covid-19 Related Surveys. (2020). 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 
• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html  
• Alaska hosts several websites specifically focused on Covid-19 information in Alaska. (2020). 
https://covid19.alaska.gov/ 
• Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium (ANTHC) (https://anthc.org/covid19/covid19readiness/), 
Cook Inlet Tribal Council (https://citci.org/covid19/), Southcentral Foundation 
(https://www.southcentralfoundation.com/novel-coronavirus-covid-19/) and Yukon-Kuskokwim 
Health Corporation (https://www.ykhc.org/covid-19/) all provide specific information related to 
Covid-19, while some also include specific information and resources for preparing Tribal health 
leaders and medical professionals for Covid-19. (2020).  
• U.S. Senators in Alaska provide constituents with detailed, specific information regarding Covid-
19. See Senator Murkowski (https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/issues/issues-and-priorities/covid-
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19-coronavirus-information), Senator Sullivan (https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/coronavirus) and 
Representative Young (https://donyoung.house.gov/constituentservices/coronavirus-resource-
center.htm).  
• Preventive measures in Alaska: on 10 April 2020, the Governor of Alaska and the DHSS announced 
additional health guidance designed to combat and mitigate the spread of the virus even though 
Alaska had not yet reported a single confirmed Covid-19 case 
(https://ready.alaska.gov/Covid19/Documents/GOA/03.10.2020%20GOA%20-
%20SOA%20Urges%20Alaskans%20to%20follow%20New%20Health%20Guidance.pdf). Two days 
earlier, DHSS had released a public statement specifying a number of steps it was taking to respond 
to the pandemic, many of which had addressed management and mitigation 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/SiteAssets/Pages/HumanCoV/COVID-19_DHSSResponse.pdf).  
• Senior Alaskan officials instituted Health Mandates (required) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-
mandates/) and Alerts (advised) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-alerts/) designed to address, 
manage, and mitigate risks and protect public health. Examples of some of these mandates 
include: critical infrastructure operations; education; entertainment and dining; fishing vessels; 
travel restrictions limiting all non-essential travel -- particularly to rural Alaska and remote 
communities -- to minimize infections in communities with limited capacity and ability to respond to 
infections.  
• Fisherman’s Handbook developed for the Bristol Bay Regional Seafood Development Association 
in Alaska, which include guidelines for the region’s commercial fishing fleet. (2020). 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56b0dfb660b5e98b87fc3d52/t/5ec3fc4ecc9a666e61c3e363/
1589902415381/BB+COVID+Handbook+v4.pdf 
• Municipalities and towns in Alaska provide specific information regarding mental health services 
and support. (2020). https://www.namijuneau.org/covid-19-mental-health-resources 
• National American Indian and Alaskan Mental Health Technology Transfer Center (MHTTC) 
provides a resource guide for mental health providers during Covid-19. (2020). 
https://mhttcnetwork.org/centers/national-american-indian-and-alaska-native-
mhttc/product/resource-guide-mental-health 
• National Indian Health Board (NIHB) provides a collection of links and information on Covid-19 
funding opportunities, including a running tracker of available grants. (2020). 
https://www.nihb.org/covid-19/funding-opportunities/ 
• Support and guidance provided to food establishments (https://dec.alaska.gov/eh/fss/food/food-
worker-and-establishment-guidance-on-covid-19/) and farmers’ markets 
(https://dec.alaska.gov/eh/fss/food/farmers-markets/covid-19-guidance/) on how to prevent the 
spread of Covid-19. Alaska Division of Environment and Health’s Food Safety and Sanitation 
Program. (2020).  
• Alaska Statewide Virtual System. Department of Education and Early Development. (2020). 
https://aklearns.org/aksvs/ 
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• Alaska Educators and the Coronavirus Outbreak (resources and tools) (2020). 
http://www.neaalaska.org/akcovid-19/ 
• Covid-19 Rapid Response Grants in Alaska. Established in response to educators’ emerging needs, 
addressing the effects of Covid-19 pandemic on teaching and learning. (includes other links with 
more resources for students and leaders) (2020). http://www.neaalaska.org/akcovid-19/ 
• Impact of Covid-19 on K-12 in Alaska (2020). 
https://education.alaska.gov/safeschools/infectiousdisease 
• Alaska DHSS created specific, focused and information for high-risk groups 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/highrisk.aspx), families and children 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/wellbeing.aspx), and other specific groups 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/populations.aspx). (2020).  
• Utilization of digital tools during the pandemic and challenges related to it. (Salminen, 2020).  
• Collecting Experiences: Pandemic Stories and Conversations. (2020). 
https://gwichin.ca/covid?fbclid=IwAR1MFELGEUDXSf3XW7pkAxvNFJk4x5wJhXSZqfTLZ4m9YL5zJf7YP
JeKT70. The project also offers webinars and sharing circles: 
https://www.facebook.com/hotiitseeda/videos/1366286553561601/.     
• Canadian public service announcements about Covid-19 (2020). Government of Canada. 
https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1583781906998/1583781926813 (available in French and English 
and multiple Indigenous languages) 
• Northwest Territories Association of Communities, Music NWT, and the GNWT campaign to 
Protect Our Elders Through Covid-19 Crisis. (2020). https://www.gov.nt.ca/en/newsroom/nwtac-
music-nwt-and-gnwt-team-protect-our-elders-through-covid-19-crisis. GNWT works to provide 
materials and videos translated into Canada’s official languages 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SFjjt3lKU4) and also in NWT’s Indigenous languages 
(https://www.gov.nt.ca/covid-19/en/services/translated-information).  




Risk management and mitigation 
• Compilation of Covid-19 federal, provincial and Inuit Nunangat support for Inuit in Canada. (2020).  
• Regional updates on support for Indigenous Peoples Government of Canada Indigenous 
Community Support Fund (ICSF) (2020).  
• CommunityFirst Covid-19 Roadmap (2020) is a 3-step online planning tool to support Indigenous 
communities to Organize, Prepare and Respond to Covid-19. (also available in Inuktitut). 
https://www.communityfirstcovid19.org/ 
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• Letter of advice from a doctor: fellows from Chukotka living in settlements and in reindeer herding 
camps. (2020).  
• Alaska Governor declared Covid-19 a Public Health Disaster Emergency on 11 April 2020, 




• Preventive measures in Alaska: on 10 April 2020, the Governor of Alaska and the DHSS announced 
additional health guidance designed to combat and mitigate the spread of the virus even though 
Alaska had not yet reported a single confirmed Covid-19 case 
(https://ready.alaska.gov/Covid19/Documents/GOA/03.10.2020%20GOA%20-
%20SOA%20Urges%20Alaskans%20to%20follow%20New%20Health%20Guidance.pdf).  
• Senior Alaskan officials instituted Health Mandates (required) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-
mandates/) and Alerts (advised) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-alerts/) designed to address, 
manage, and mitigate risks and protect public health. Examples of some of these mandates 
include: critical infrastructure operations; education; entertainment and dining; fishing vessels; 
travel restrictions limiting all non-essential travel -- particularly to rural Alaska and remote 
communities -- to minimize infections in communities with limited capacity and ability to respond to 
infections.  
• Covid-19 and fisheries: Bristol Bay Borough in Alaska established a website and links to response 
plans developed by the region’s largest fish processors to protect its US 1.5 billion salmon fishery 
industry. (2020). http://www.bristolbayboroughak.us/covid-19_information/index.php 
• Fisherman’s Handbook developed for the Bristol Bay Regional Seafood Development Association 
in Alaska, which include guidelines for the region’s commercial fishing fleet. (2020). 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56b0dfb660b5e98b87fc3d52/t/5ec3fc4ecc9a666e61c3e363/
1589902415381/BB+COVID+Handbook+v4.pdf 
• Economic impact of Covid-19 in Alaska: April 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/apr20.pdf) and 
May 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/may20.pdf) Alaska Economic Trends publications.  
• Alaska subsistence and commercial fisheries designated as “critical infrastructure industries” that 
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Part II: Consequences of Pandemic and Public Health Responses 
Impacts on physical well-being and mental health 
• U.S. National Institute of Health Covid-19 clinical trials projects. 
(2020). https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?cond=COVID-19  
• Covid-19 and gender equality: discussion between the Prime Minister of Iceland and Austrian 
Minister of Equality. (2020, 6 May). https://www.government.is/news/article/2020/05/06/Prime-
Minister-of-Iceland-and-Austrian-Minister-of-Equality-discuss-COVID-19-and-gender-equality/ 
• Coronavirus and other health risks among Inuit. ICC Covid-19 Statement. (2020). 
https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/coronavirus-and-other-health-risks-among-inuit/ 
 
• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html  
 
• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. Data, Statistics and Publications on MCH 
Epidemiology, Covid-19 Related Surveys. (2020). 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/default.aspx 
• Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists proposes a Standardized surveillance case 
definition and national notification for 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) (2020). 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/7c7iyv48sz2t488/Dardynskaia-Irina_20-May-1141-attach1.pdf?dl=0  
• Municipalities and towns in Alaska provide specific information regarding mental health services 
and support. (2020). https://www.namijuneau.org/covid-19-mental-health-resources  
• Arctic Council news article on Biodiversity and Human Health: Less Biodiversity, More Infectious 
Diseases? (May 2020). https://arctic-council.org/en/news/biodiversity-and-human-health-less-
biodiversity-more-infectious-diseases/  
• National American Indian and Alaskan Mental Health Technology Transfer Center (MHTTC) 
provides a resource guide for mental health providers during Covid-19. 
(2020). https://mhttcnetwork.org/centers/national-american-indian-and-alaska-native-
mhttc/product/resource-guide-mental-health  
• National Indian Health Board (NIHB) provides a collection of links and information on Covid-19 
funding opportunities, including a running tracker of available grants. 
(2020). https://www.nihb.org/covid-19/funding-opportunities/  
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• Support and guidance provided to food establishments (https://dec.alaska.gov/eh/fss/food/food-
worker-and-establishment-guidance-on-covid-19/) and farmers’ markets 
(https://dec.alaska.gov/eh/fss/food/farmers-markets/covid-19-guidance/) on how to prevent the 
spread of Covid-19. Alaska Division of Environment and Health’s Food Safety and Sanitation 
Program. (2020).  
• Inuit Circumpolar Council – Contributions to Arctic Council Covid-19 briefing document. (2020). 
https://arctic-council.org/en/news/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-inuit-communities/ 
• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National 
Research University of the Russian Federation. (2020).   
• Covid-19 and implication on foods: food supply chain, food/nutrition security and concerns about 
food availability. (2020). https://www.ktoo.org/2020/04/14/amid-food-supply-chain-concerns-
tribal-governments-request-emergency-hunts/ 
• Native American Food Sovereignty Alliance: Addressing Food/Nutrition Security for Indigenous 
Peoples Across the United States. (2020). https://nativefoodalliance.org/ 
• Indigenous healing. (2020). https://www.ozy.com/news-and-politics/the-native-american-healer-
reviving-the-medicine-of-her-ancestors/90855/ 
• Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Canadian International Arctic Centre, Embassy of Canada to Norway. 
(2020).  




• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19  
• Indigenous peoples health and safety during Coronavirus (COVID-19). Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the Untied Nations. (2020). http://www.fao.org/indigenous-peoples/covid-19/en/ 
• Policy Brief: COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. (May 2020).  
 
Impacts on regional and local economies 
• Inuit Nunangat – Canadian Federal Government support for Inuit (pp. 57-65). ICC-Canada. (2020).  
• Economic Response Package: looking at mitigation and economic response in Iceland. Government 
of Iceland Second Phase of Economic Response Package to the Covid-19 Crisis. (April 2020). 
https://www.government.is/news/article/2020/04/21/Government-of-Iceland-Announces-Second-
Phase-of-Economic-Response-Package-to-the-COVID-19-Crisis/ 
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• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• New Canadian Federal Covid-19 Response Measures for Arctic and Northern Regions (Canada). 
Backgrounder. (April 2020).  
• Fisherman’s Handbook developed for the Bristol Bay Regional Seafood Development 
Association in Alaska, which include guidelines for the region’s commercial fishing fleet. 
(2020). https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56b0dfb660b5e98b87fc3d52/t/5ec3fc4ecc9a666e61
c3e363/1589902415381/BB+COVID+Handbook+v4.pdf 
• Economic impact of Covid-19 in Alaska: April 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/apr20.pdf) and 
May 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/may20.pdf) Alaska Economic Trends publications.  
• Alaska subsistence and commercial fisheries designated as “critical infrastructure industries” that 
enable operation during the 2020 season. https://gov.alaska.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/Alaska-Essential-Services-and-Critical-Workforce-Infrastructure-Formerly-
Attachment-A-05.05.2020.pdf  
• Covid-19 and fisheries: Bristol Bay Borough in Alaska established a website and links to response 
plans developed by the region’s largest fish processors to protect its US 1.5 billion salmon fishery 
industry. (2020). http://www.bristolbayboroughak.us/covid-19_information/index.php   
• Senior Alaskan officials instituted Health Mandates (required) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-
mandates/) and Alerts (advised) (https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-alerts/) designed to address, 
manage, and mitigate risks and protect public health. Examples of some of these mandates 
include: critical infrastructure operations; education; entertainment and dining; fishing vessels; 
travel restrictions limiting all non-essential travel -- particularly to rural Alaska and remote 
communities -- to minimize infections in communities with limited capacity and ability to respond to 
infections.  
• Covid-19 Economic Stabilization. Alaska Economic Stabilization Team Office of Governor Mike 
Dunleavy. (2020). https://gov.alaska.gov/home/covid-19-economy/ 
• Economic stabilization in Alaska: the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority 
announced in March USD 50 000 000 loan guarantee to Alaska’s banks and financial institutions 
during Covid-19. (March 2020). 
http://www.aidea.org/Portals/0/PressReleases/033120AIDEACreates1BProgramConfrontCOVID19Ec
onomicCrisis.pdf 
• Economic stabilization in Alaska: information hub with resources for individuals and businesses 
regarding economic impact. (2020). 
http://www.aidea.org/Portals/0/PressReleases/033120AIDEACreates1BProgramConfrontCOVID19Ec
onomicCrisis.pdf. Resources also available to businesses and workers, including unemployed during 
the pandemic. (2020). https://labor.alaska.gov/COVID-19-SOA.htm 
• Protective measures for commercial fishing vessels in Alaska in order to prevent the spread of 
Covid-19. (2020). https://covid19.alaska.gov/health-mandates/ 
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• Reopen Alaska Responsibility Plan (phased strategy). (2020). https://covid19.alaska.gov/reopen/ 
• Serious financial impact on colleges and universities: the case of the University of Alaska with 
estimated USD 35-40M in forgone revenues. (2020). 
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=31&docid=61892 
• Emergency relief fund to support students and institutions in Alaska: 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html 




• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National Research 
University of the Russian Federation. (2020).  
• Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Canadian International Arctic Centre, Embassy of Canada to Norway. 
(2020).   
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19   
• Government of Canada initiatives related to Covid-19 in the North – overview document. (2020).  
 
Impacts on social and cultural environments 
• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• New Canadian Federal Covid-19 Response Measures for Arctic and Northern Regions (Canada). 
Backgrounder. (April 2020).  
• Arctic Investigations Program (AIP) by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
that prioritizes monitoring and controlling infectious diseases in Alaska (with a focus on Alaska 
Native people and other Indigenous populations across the Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dpei/aip/index.html  
• Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) website focused on Covid-19 in the 
State of Alaska. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx including a specific 
focus on infectious diseases http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/default.aspx 
• Covid-19 tracking site for Alaska. (2020). https://coronavirus-response-alaska-dhss.hub.arcgis.com/ 
• Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. Data, Statistics and Publications on MCH 
Epidemiology, Covid-19 Related Surveys. (2020). 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/Pages/mchepi/default.aspx 
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• Arctic Council news article on Biodiversity and Human Health: Less Biodiversity, More Infectious 
Diseases? (May 2020). https://arctic-council.org/en/news/biodiversity-and-human-health-less-
biodiversity-more-infectious-diseases/   
• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National Research 
University of the Russian Federation. (2020).  
• The COVID-19 pandemic forced the closure of a number of cultural centers (e.g., art museums, 
special exhibits), including the Alaska Native Heritage Center. Impacts include lack of revenue for 






• Alaska Statewide Virtual System. Department of Education and Early Development. 
(2020). https://aklearns.org/aksvs/  
• Alaska Educators and the Coronavirus Outbreak (resources and tools) 
(2020). http://www.neaalaska.org/akcovid-19/  
• Covid-19 Rapid Response Grants was established in response to educators’ emerging needs, 
addressing the effects of Covid-19 pandemic on teaching and learning. (includes other links with 
more resources for students and leaders) (2020). http://www.neaalaska.org/akcovid-19/  
• Impact of Covid-19 on K-12 in Alaska 
(2020). https://education.alaska.gov/safeschools/infectiousdisease  
• Serious financial impact on colleges and universities: the case of the University of 
Alaska with estimated USD 35-40M in forgone revenues. 
(2020). http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=31&docid=61892  
• Emergency relief fund to support students and institutions in 
Alaska: https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/caresact.html  
• Covid-19 impacts on Canadian Heritage activities in Canada’s Arctic. (2020). 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/xeweewuhnkd6jat/Oleary-Katherine_22-
May_2045%20%28Heritage%20Canada%20input%20for%20Covid-19%29.docx?dl=0 
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19  
• Policy Brief: COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. (May 2020).  
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Impacts on vulnerable persons 
• Economic Response Package: looking at mitigation and economic response in Iceland. Government 
of Iceland Second Phase of Economic Response Package to the Covid-19 Crisis. (April 
2020). https://www.government.is/news/article/2020/04/21/Government-of-Iceland-Announces-
Second-Phase-of-Economic-Response-Package-to-the-COVID-19-Crisis/   
• Mitigation activity: public funds toward student summer jobs with goal of creating 3 400 temporary 
jobs for students. (2020). https://www.stjornarradid.is/efst-a-baugi/frettir/stok-
frett/2020/05/13/Taekifaeri-fyrir-namsmenn-adgerdir-stjornvalda-vegna-sumarstarfa-og-
sumarnams/ 
• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• Alaska Mental Health Trust, Covid-19 Response Trust Grant Program established for 
beneficiaries facing complications operating and providing critical services during the Covid-19 
pandemic. (2020). https://alaskamentalhealthtrust.org/alaska-mental-health-trust-
authority/grants/covid-19-response-grant-program/    
• Municipalities and towns in Alaska provide specific information regarding mental health services 
and support. (2020). https://www.namijuneau.org/covid-19-mental-health-resources   
• National American Indian and Alaskan Mental Health Technology Transfer Center (MHTTC) 
provides a resource guide for mental health providers during Covid-19. 
(2020). https://mhttcnetwork.org/centers/national-american-indian-and-alaska-native-
mhttc/product/resource-guide-mental-health   
• Alaska DHSS created specific, focused and information for high-risk groups 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/highrisk.aspx), families and children 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/wellbeing.aspx), and other specific groups 
(http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Epi/id/Pages/COVID-19/populations.aspx). (2020).  
• Indigenous women in the Yukon. Family Violence Prevention Program. Indigenous Services 
Canada. (2020).  
• Elders in communities across Alaska: impacts to their safety as Alaska reopens along with 
overcrowding of many rural homes due to lack of housing which raises possibility of Covid-19 
spread. (2020). https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/03/15/most-alaska-villages-lack-road-access-
and-hospitals-heres-how-theyll-fight-the-coronavirus/ 
• Youth – impacts on being inside for so long, physical activity promotion, challenges. Anchorage 
Daily News. (2020). https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/education/2020/05/20/alaska-kids-are-
spending-less-time-exercising-and-more-time-on-screens-during-the-pandemic-survey-shows/ 
• Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Canadian International Arctic Centre, Embassy of Canada to Norway. 
(2020).  
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• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19  
• Policy Brief: COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. (May 2020).  
• Icelandic news article about two deaths related to domestic violence during the national 
lockdown. (April 2020). https://www.icelandreview.com/society/two-deaths-in-iceland-raise-
concerns-of-rise-in-domestic-violence/  
• News report from The Global News on domestic violence in Russia that has been reported to have 
more than doubled amid COVID-19 lockdown. (May 2020). 
https://globalnews.ca/news/6910108/coronavirus-russia-domestic-violence/ 
• News article in The Economist on how domestic violence has increased during coronavirus 
lockdowns in American cities. (April 2020). https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2020/04/22/domestic-violence-has-increased-during-coronavirus-lockdowns 
• Blog article on unicef website about five ways governments are responding to violence against 




Impacts on knowledge production 
• U.S. National Institute of Health Covid-19 clinical trials projects. 
(2020). https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/results?cond=COVID-19   
• Norwegian evidence map providing extensive overview of global network of research on Covid-19 
(2020). https://sciencenorway.no/epidemic-virus/norwegian-evidence-map-may-be-one-of-the-
worlds-most-systematic-overviews-of-research-on-covid-19/1676520 
• Nordic Health Data Research Projects on Covid-19. (2020). https://en.rannis.is/news/nordic-health-
data-research-projects-on-covid-19 
• Potential Impacts of COVID-19 on the 2020 Activities of the Canadian Northern Contaminants 
Program and Proposed Management Approach: Document goes through list of effected research 
activities due to travel restrictions and affected funding, as well as their impact on students and 
their employment and graduation requirements – this program is affiliated with the AMAP working 
group.  
• Universities and educational institutions have as a result of Covid-19 increased heavily digital 
teaching and developed new learning platforms and techniques. The Covid-19 crisis may therefore 
broaden the range of courses offered online to remote communities – thus making education more 
easily available. See: Business Index North (BIN) report dealing with Sustainability in the Arctic 
Regions: What, How and Why? released by the High North Center for Business and 
Governance, Nord University. (May 2020). https://businessindexnorth.com/Home   
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• Analytical review on Covid-19 Pandemic in the Arctic: Briefing Material for SAOs, National Research 
University of the Russian Federation. (2020).   
• In early April, the NSF urged the scientific community to submit proposals to conduct non-medical, 
non-clinical research on COVID-19. As of May 20, the NSF had funded over 460 research projects 
addressing COVID-19 impacts. Recently funded NSF research includes projects evaluating the 
environmental effects of COVID-19 quarantine orders, including impacts on urban air quality, water 
quality, particulate emissions, and weather. https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2020/nsf20052/nsf20052.jsp 
• Arctic Observing Summit 2020 (AOS) Conference Statement and Call to Action. (2020).  
• Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Canadian International Arctic Centre, Embassy of Canada to Norway. 
(2020).  
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19  
 
Mobility 
• Learning traditional Inuit skills while bracing for Covid-19 in Canada’s Arctic. (2020). 
https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/on-the-land-during-a-pandemic/#.Xqc6xM49DgI.email 
• Inuit Circumpolar Council . Coronavirus and other health risks among Inuit. (2020). 
https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/coronavirus-and-other-health-risks-among-inuit/ 
• The COVID-19 pandemic forced the closure of a number of cultural centers (e.g., art museums, 
special exhibits), including the Alaska Native Heritage Center. Impacts include lack of revenue for 





information/; https://www.explorefairbanks.com/blog/post/covid-19/.  
• Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic. Canadian International Arctic Centre, Embassy of Canada to Norway. 
(2020).  
• Information about Covid-19 from the Government of the Yukon in Canada. 
(2020). https://yukon.ca/covid-19  
• Supporting key priorities identified by Northern Premiers. Government of Canada. (April 2020).  
• Canada-United States border closing or restricted access. Implications for international mobility. 
(2020).  
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Enabling public infrastructure 
• Inuit Circumpolar Council . Coronavirus and other health risks among Inuit. (2020). 
https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/coronavirus-and-other-health-risks-among-inuit/ 
• Summary of actions and activities taken by the Government of Nunavut and other Northern 
Indigenous Organizations in response to Covid-19. (2020).  
• New Canadian Federal Covid-19 Response Measures for Arctic and Northern Regions (Canada). 
Backgrounder. (April 2020). 
• Economic impact of Covid-19 in Alaska: April 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/apr20.pdf) and 
May 2020 (https://labor.alaska.gov/trends/may20.pdf) Alaska Economic Trends publications.    
• Alaska subsistence and commercial fisheries designated as “critical infrastructure industries” that 
enable operation during the 2020 season. https://gov.alaska.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/Alaska-Essential-Services-and-Critical-Workforce-Infrastructure-Formerly-
Attachment-A-05.05.2020.pdf   
• Devastation for Alaska’s tourism industry. (May 2020). https://www.ktoo.org/2020/05/17/alaskas-
quarantine-order-has-helped-thwart-covid-19-but-devastated-tourism-will-dunleavy-keep-it/ 
• Devastation for Alaska’s cruise industry. (May 2020). 
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/05/06/carnival-princess-holland-america-cancel-all-2020-
alaska-cruises/ 
• Keep Americans Connected Pledge. U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 
https://www.fcc.gov/keep-americans-connected 
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Appendix 2 – Detailed overview of process to prepare briefing document 
Discussions about the potential impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on the Arctic and the 
priorities and mandate of the Arctic Council arose early. In late April 2020 the Chair of the 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAOC) requested that the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG) and Arctic Council Secretariat (ACS) prepare a briefing document for SAOs, collecting 
available information on the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic in the Arctic from experts, 
policymakers and Indigenous representatives and knowledge holders connected to the Arctic 
Council.  
A coordinating team was quickly established to support this work, which included the Chairs of 
the Arctic Human Health Expert Group (AHHEG) and the Social, Economic and Cultural Expert 
Group (SECEG), the Executive Secretary of the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG), and an Advisor and the Head of Communications from the Arctic Council Secretariat. 
The preparation of this briefing document relied on the existing networks of the Arctic Council’s 
six Working Groups, national delegations and Indigenous Permanent Participants and adopted 
an open and collaborative approach.  
It involved contributions and input from more than fifty researchers, policy makers, Indigenous 
representatives and Indigenous knowledge holders from all Arctic States and Permanent 
Participants. This group provided source material and helped shape and define the twelve 
thematic sections that are covered in this briefing document. To facilitate involvement by 
Indigenous peoples and ensure their perspectives were reflected, Permanent Participants were 
also given the option to share their insights and experiences with the pandemic by responding 
to interview questions (see appendix 3). In addition, this document is informed by the 
expertise shared during a virtual conference on Covid-19 Impacts in the Arctic organized by the 
US Naval War College, the Wilson Center's Polar Institute, and the US Arctic Research 
Commission2.  
Subsequently, the coordinating team consolidated the information collected in an internal 
online tracking tool that organized the material into the twelve thematic sections identified for 
the briefing document. At this time, authors were confirmed to draft each section. Drawing on 
 
2 The Arctic Mayors’ Forum met online 22 April 2020 to discuss the Covid-19 situation in their communities. Data is 
being collected through a survey inquiring about the status of infections and related issues, as well as socio-
economic impacts, an overview of implemented restrictive measures and next steps.  
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this information collected, the authors were asked to identify themes and issues for their 
thematic section and to consider potential gaps in knowledge and/or ideas for potential 
action areas. A total of 17 authors were involved in preparing this briefing document. Several 
rounds of feedback and revision were undertaken with the authors before the final version was 
distributed to the delegates of the June SAOX for their discussion.   
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Appendix 3 – Consultation with Permanent Participants  
Representatives of the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants were invited to share insights to 
how Indigenous peoples across the Arctic are affected by the pandemic and the measures taken 
to contain it through a questionnaire for narrative input. Members of all Permanent Participant 
organizations were contacted and given the opportunity to address the set of questions listed 
below. 
Questionnaire for Permanent Participants 
• How are [add Indigenous people's name] communities affected by the coronavirus 
pandemic? (immediate health effects: how many people have been infected, etc.)  
• How are [add Indigenous people’s name] informed about the pandemic and measures 
taken to tackle it?   
• Are there health issues and/or other factors that could influence the susceptibility 
of [add Indigenous people’s name]? (infrastructure, inadequate/crowded housing, 
water/sewer, etc.) What steps have/could be taken to alleviate these problems?  
• How are [add Indigenous people's name] communities affected by the national 
measures taken to contain the coronavirus? (positive and negative impacts, such as 
undisrupted calving season, travel restrictions, isolation, disconnections from elders, 
business closures, closed borders etc.)  
• Have [add Indigenous people’s name] communities taken any measures in addition to 
national/regional measures to contain the outbreak?  
• Are there examples of community resilience that have helped in this situation?   
• Could you describe the health facilities [add Indigenous people’s name] communities 
have access to and how far away they are from communities? (medical care facilities, 
distance to hospitals, etc.)   
Oral interviews were conducted with Jimmy Stotts and Dalee Sambo Dorough from the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC). Written contributions were received from the Aleut International 
Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, ICC Chukotka, the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. Thus, all six 
Permanent Participants provided input.  
The interviews can be found here: https://arctic-council.org/en/news/the-impact-of-covid-19-
on-indigenous-peoples-in-the-arctic/ 
